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The rise of financial technology (fintech) has the potential to
provide better-quality financial services to more people. Although these
enhanced financial services have arisen in order to meet consumer
need, their regulatory status threatens that progress. Many fintech
firms are regulated on a state-by-state basis even though their
transactions are interstate, and they compete with firms that enjoy
more consistent rules through federal preemption. This dynamic can
harm efficiency, competitive equity, and political equity. This Article
examines developments in marketplace lending, money transmission,
and online sales of securities in an attempt to identify situations in
which greater federalization of the rules may be justified. It also
considers a situation in which the federal government should abstain
from intervening, even if it has the right to do so. Whether the states or
federal government should take the lead in regulating fintech is an
emerging and important question whose answer will affect the
financial lives of consumers and investors. This Article seeks to begin
a conversation about how to determine whether federalism or
federalization is appropriate.
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Financial technology, or "fintech," is the application of
technology to the provision of financial services. Although fintech
itself is not new, the ways in which people can transmit money, access
credit, and invest have recently significantly changed. The influx of
new competitors leveraging technology to provide more access, more
efficiency, and better value than the status quo is destabilizing the
financial industry because these new methods and market
participants often do not easily fit in the existing regulatory boxes.
These rapid changes are straining existing regulatory assumptions,
including the issue of whether and how the states or federal
government should regulate fintech firms.
Technology allows fintech firms, many of which lack a
traditional financial pedigree or charter, to compete at scale with
established entities such as banks-something previously considered
too difficult to profitably do in the past. Adding to the momentum,
venture capitalists and institutional investors put significant money
into fintech startups, either as investors or customers.' Meanwhile,
incumbents have reacted to the disruption with a mix of trying to
"beat them,"2 "join them,"3 and "sic the cops on them."4 Regulators
and policymakers have also taken an interest in fintech; they have
1. JULIAN SKAN ET AL., FINTECH AND THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE: LANDING POINTS FOR
THE INDUSTRY 2-3 (2016), http://fintechinnovationlab.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/FintechEvolving-Landscape_2016.pdf fhttps://perma.ccAW9Z-QPPQ]. In 2015,
approximately $22.3 billion was invested in fintech firms globally-an increase of 75 percent
from the previous year. Id. at 3.
2. See, e.g., Jason Del Rey, America's Biggest Banks Have Announced Their Venmo
Competitor, Zelle, RECODE (Oct. 24, 2016, 12:18 AM),
https://www.recode.net/20 16/10/24/13376676/payments-zelle-banks-venmo-paypal-send-money
[https://perma.cc/PHP5-96M6] (discussing a product created by a consortium of banks to compete
with Venmo for the person-to-person payments market); Kevin Wack, The Battle Begins: Banks
Take on Online Lending Rivals, AM. BANKER (Oct. 30, 2016, 9:00 PM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-battle-begins-banks-take-on-online-lending-rivals
[https://perma.cc/88AZ-ABUT] (discussing bank-created online lending platforms designed
specifically to compete with marketplace lenders).
3. See, e.g., Peter Rudegeair, Emily Glazer & Ruth Simon, Inside J.P. Morgan's Deal
with On Deck Capital, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 30, 2015, 6:44 PM), http://www.wsj.comlarticles/inside-j-
p-morgans-deal-with-on-deck-capital-1451519092 [https://perma.cc/F5EY-7THZ].
4. CLEARING HOUSE, ENSURING CONSISTENT CONSUMER PROTECTION FOR DATA
SECURITY: MAJOR BANKS VS. ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT PROVIDERS 2-3 (2015),
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/files/research/tchconsumer%20protection%20for%20
data%20security%20august%2020 15%2Ofinal.pdf?a=en [https://perma.cc/3LAN-PE84] (arguing
that regulation of nonbank payment services providers is inadequate and should be brought to
the level of banks).
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hosted events5 and hearings6 and have otherwise pondered what
changes in technology mean for regulation.7
From a regulatory perspective, it is significant that fintech
facilitates companies of all sizes to compete on a national scale.8
Although certain market participants-especially banks-enjoy
relatively uniform regulation of important aspects of their business
because of federal law, many new competitors are governed on a
state-by-state basis.9 If these new entrants' activities are primarily
intrastate, there is little cause for concern. However, if the scope of
the transaction exceeds the reach of regulation, there could be a
significant problem.
Incongruous regulation could place new entrants at an undue
disadvantage compared to their incumbent competitors and may
deprive consumers of a fully competitive market. Different business
methods may create different risks, in which case differential
regulation may be justified. However, if the ensuing risks are
functionally identical, then different regulatory structures-such as a
federal grant of uniformity for only some competitors-are
inappropriate. 10
However, new companies and their consumers are not the only
ones who stand to lose from a mismatch between the economic reality
and the level of regulation. This mismatch can also lead to people
being subject to regulation without representation-as some states
5. Adrienne Harris, The Future of Finance Is Now, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 10, 2016,
6:00 PM), https://www.whitehouse.govfblog/2016/06/10/future-finance-now [https://perma.cc/
8UCG-XWWJ] (summarizing a 2016 White House summer event regarding fintech); see Press
Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Forum on Supporting Responsible Innovation
in the Federal Banking System (June 23, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-
releases/2016/nr-occ-2016-55a.pdf [https://perma.cc[NM6E-9JTB]; see also Adrienne Harris &
Alex Zerden, A Framework for FinTech, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 13, 2017, 6:36 PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2017/01/13/framework-fintech [https://perma.cc/4ZS3-US63]
(providing a framework for fintech policy).
6. See Examining the Opportunities and Challenges with Financial Technology
('TinTech"): The Development of Online Marketplace Lending: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. (2016); Disrupter
Series: Digital Currency and Blockchain Technology: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Mfg., and Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. (2016);
Bitcoin: Examining the Benefits and Risks for Small Businesses: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Small Bus., 113th Cong. (2014).
7. See Letter from Sens. Sherrod Brown & Jeffrey A. Merkley to Janet Yellen, Chair of
Fed. Reserve, Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Martin Gruenberg, Chair of the
FDIC, Rick Metsger, Chair of the Nat'l Credit Union Admin. & Richard Cordray, Dir. of the
CFPB (July 21, 2016), http://www.brown.senate.gov/download/fintech-letter-2016-07-21.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See discussion infra Part III.A-C.
10. See infra Part IV.
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may be more economically important than others-which may allow
those states to disproportionally control the types of products that
companies offer in national markets.
State regulation in certain situations has its benefits; after all,
state regulation may lead to socially beneficial competition among
regulators." Nevertheless, when state regulators wrest control over
national markets, the citizens of less powerful states may become
subject to de facto regulation in which those citizens have no say.12
This "predation," as Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine
Sharkey call it,13 denies citizens democratic recourse and harms their
autonomy. Conversely, if the transaction is intrastate, states are likely
able to handle regulation and impose their own requirements without
the federal government's intrusion, even if it technically has
jurisdiction.
This Article considers whether the current balance of state and
federal regulations in markets for credit, money transmission, virtual
currency, and the sale of securities makes sense. Has the reality of
those markets changed such that the balance should be reconsidered?
Does the current balance damage the interests of efficiency,
competitive equity among market participants, or political equity
among citizens?
The answer is mixed. In cases of nonbank "marketplace
lending"14 (online lending by a nonbank entity that is funded by the
11. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, A Single-License Approach to Regulating
Insurance (Nw. Univ. Pritzker Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 154, 2008),
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edulfacultyworkingpapers/154 [https:/perma.cc/
TQ6Q-Q4EY] (arguing for a federal law that allows insurance companies to sell insurance
nationwide using their home state license); J.W. Verret, A Dual Non-Banking System? Or a
Non-Dual Non-Banking System? Considering the OCC's Proposal for a Non-Bank Special
Purpose National Charter for Fintech Companies, Against an Alternative Competitive Federalism
System, for an Era of Fintech Banking 35-37 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ., Research Paper
No. 17-05, 2017), https://ssrn.comlabstract=2906329 [https://perma.cc/7XUQ-AAUQI.
12. See infra Part IV.C.
13. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353, 1431 (2006).
14. Strictly defined, marketplace lending would require a market for selling the loan to
potential buyers, which already exists at lenders such as Prosper and Lending Club. See How
Does an Online Credit Marketplace Work?, LENDING CLUB,
https://www.lendingelub.com/public/how-peer-lending-works.action [https://perma.cc/YKZ7-
UAPD] (last visited Sept. 28, 2017); Peer-to-Peer Lending Means Everyone Prospers, PROSPER,
https://www.prosper.com/plp/how-it-works [https://perma.cclQE2X-AMFZ] (last visited Sept. 28,
2017). However, the term "marketplace" has been used more broadly when discussing the wave
of recent innovative lenders, as in the case of the California Department of Business Oversight's
inquiry. See Press Release, Jan Lynn Owen, Comm'r of Bus. Oversight, Cal. Dep't of Bus.
Oversight, California DBO Announces Inquiry into 'Marketplace' Lending Industry (Dec. 11,
2015), http://www.dbo.ca.gov/Press/press-releases/2015/DBO%2OInquiry%20Announcement%
2017] 133
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sale of the loans or by lender equity, frequently involving a bank
partnership),1 5 money transmission,1 6 virtual currency,1 7 and the
interstate sale of securities over the Internet,18 the transactional
reality has become far more national in nature. As a result,
transactions subject to state-by-state regulation are less efficient and
less equitable.19 This lack of efficiency and equitability could justify
harmonizing or displacing existing state regulations, either by the
states themselves or through preemptive federal regulations. By
contrast, the recent reform of Rule 147 by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), a rule that initially sought to impose
substantive federal requirements on inherently interstate
transactions (use of the Internet notwithstanding), is an area where
the federal government should defer to the states.20
This Article cannot tackle all the issues implicated by changes
in financial technology.2 1 Although this Article does not fully cover
topics such as cybersecurity regulation, it offers principles for
analyzing a wide range of topics.2 2 This Article is agnostic as to the
underlying substance of regulation. It takes no position on the
wisdom of any interest rate limit or licensing requirement. Rather,
this Article seeks to analyze whether discrepancies between the
entities that regulate competitors are justified. Given the scope and
breadth of the topic, the dynamism of the market, and the fact that
some of these questions ultimately come down to different policy
preferences, this Article does not purport to be the definitive work on
the topic. Rather, it merely seeks to propose criteria to be used by
policymakers and citizens and debated by all interested parties.
Part II of this Article discusses some of the characteristics of
fintech that are most salient for determining whether the states or the
2012-11-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LQP-9PEH]. This Article adopts the broader definition. See
infra Part III.A.3.
15. See infra Part III.A.3.
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part III.C.
18. See infra Part III.D.3.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Parts III.D.4, IV.D.
21. This Article does not address issues relating to international regulation of financial
products and services. Although some of the issues and dynamics may be similar, there are also
significant differences that merit their own examination.
22. In fact, cybersecurity is developing into an area where concerns about political
equity among states are highly salient, as a small number of states may wield disproportionate
influence. See, e.g., Penny Crosman, N.Y Could Set National Standard with Cybersecurity





federal government should regulate the industry. Part III provides an
overview of state and federal regulation of interest rates and the effect
of such regulations on new marketplace lenders. Part IV then turns to
money transmitters and the implications for fintech, followed first by
the related but sufficiently separate topic of virtual currencies and
then by the topic of online corporate securities offerings. Finally, Part
V discusses how the interests of efficiency, competitive equity among
market participants, and political equity among residents of various
states affect whether the states or the federal government should take
the lead in regulating a particular aspect of fintech.
II. WHAT CHARACTERISTICS OF FINTECH MATTER FOR FEDERALISM?
The modern fintech moment is marked by several
characteristics that are relevant to the question of who should
regulate the industry. Professor Christopher Brummer and Daniel
Gorfine have identified several common elements of fintech that can
change the economic and legal realities of financial transactions,
including the use of borderless platforms, low barriers to entry, and
disintermediation of traditional players and the entry of new
competitors.23
As Brummer and Gorfine note, the Internet "does not observe
geographic boundaries or borders."24 As a result, assumptions about
the geographic and political limits of a company's market that
underpinned previous regulations may no longer hold. For example, it
used to be relatively hard to reach customers in multiple states, but
now it is fairly straightforward. The Internet makes it simple for
anyone with a functioning search engine to find a financial services
provider. To avoid reaching out-of-state customers, the service
provider would need to take explicit steps to exclude customers on the
basis of their location-steps that can be easily circumvented. This
cross-border capability can make financial services more efficient by
leveraging the economies of scale provided by a national market, but it
places service providers at risk of running afoul of state regulations.
Technology allows new competitors to replace brick-and-mortar
stores with customers' computers and smartphones and to replace
some staff through automation.25 By lowering barriers to entry, new
technology allows new entrants into previously stable markets and
23. CHRISTOPHER BRUMMER & DANIEL GORFINE, FINTECH: BUILDING A 21ST-CENTURY
REGULATOR'S TOOLKIT 4-6 (2014), http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/view/665
[https://perma.cc/7MP6-EZ6S].
24. Id. at 6.
25. Id. at 5-6.
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allows new business models that would not have been possible with
the markets' traditional economics. For example, by leveraging
technology to lower overhead and to obtain capital efficiently,
marketplace lenders can compete with bankS26 without the need for
deposits or ancillary lines of business found in universal banks. As a
result, companies with dramatically different corporate profiles and
regulatory regimes can compete for the same customers.
Ease of access and the ability to offer products to a very broad
audience have very quickly attracted new entrants to compete with
traditional players.27  It may be necessary to revisit regulations
premised on relatively fixed typology for financial market
participants. New companies and new methods, such as virtual
currency, can quickly become significant from a regulatory
perspective. Additionally, established players in other industries may
now intentionally or inadvertently enter highly regulated financial
markets.
These technological factors affect the economic and business
reality of transactions in ways that implicate the division of state and
federal regulation.28 Although technology is not the be-all or end-all of
the federalism debate, to the extent that innovation is changing the
line between interstate and intrastate transactions, it bears
consideration.
III. EXAMPLES FROM THE FINTECH FRONTIER
The examples that follow highlight situations where the
changing technological and competitive landscape puts pressure on
the current allocation of regulatory authority. This Part examines the
examples of lending, money transmission, virtual currencies, and
online securities offerings. It also examines how the allocation of
power between state and federal law, and the differences between
competitors, impact both the competitive landscape and how services
can be provided.
A. Consumer and Small-Business Lending and Interest Rates
Lending is a highly regulated space with a long history.
Although many lending basics remain unchanged, lending mechanics
26. Letter from author to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency 3-4 (May 12, 2016) (citing MIKLOS DIETZ ET AL., CU'I'ING THROUGH
THE NOISE AROUND FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY (2016)), https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-
innovation/comments/comments-brian-knight.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PVM-8GZV].
27. BRUMMER & GORFINE, supra note 23, at 5.
28. See infra Part III.
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are undergoing significant innovation. What was once a face-to-face
transaction can now be handled over the Internet. Data and
algorithms are supplanting community reputation and the loan
officer's "gut," and the question of who should regulate the transaction
has become more complex as geography becomes less relevant.
1. State Regulation of Consumer and Small-Business Interest Rates
State governments have traditionally played a leading role in
lending regulation, including limitations on the amount of interest
and fees a lender can charge.29 Regulation has varied from state to
state and over time.30 Recent actions by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) and federal banking regulators may
indicate a growing "federalization" of interest rate regulation.31
Although many observers believe that interest rate and fee limits
protect consumers,32  others argue that such limits are
29. See Efraim Benmelech & Tobias J. Moskowitz, The Political Economy of Financial
Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century, 65 J. FIN. 1029, 1036
(2010). The earliest usury laws on this continent predate the founding of the United States. For
example, the Massachusetts Bay Colony enacted a usury law in 1641, with the remaining
colonies following suit in the 1700s. Id.
30. See Thomas W. Miller, Jr. & Harold A. Black, Examining Arguments Made by
Interest Rate Cap Advocates, in REFRAMING FINANCIAL REGULATION: ENHANCING STABILITY AND
PROTECTING CONSUMERS 342, 343-44 (Hester Peirce & Benjamin Klutsey eds., 2016); Benmelech
& Moskowitz, supra note 29, at 1029.
31. See, e.g., CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL 4820635, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016); see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-16-001, REPORT OF
INQUIRY INTO THE FDIC's SUPERVISORY APPROACH TO REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS AND THE
INVOLVEMENT OF THE FDIC LEADERSHIP AND PERSONNEL 2 (2016) (full report not publicly
available), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fdic-oig-ral-report_2- 19- 16-
_searchableredacted_3.16.16_redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3GM-DKKN] (detailing
supervisory conduct that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) felt improperly discouraged
certain banks from issuing refund anticipation loans, a high-interest but legal product). But see
Letter from Doreen R. Eberley, Dir. of FDIC Risk Mgmt. Supervision & Charles Yi, FDIC Gen.
Counsel, to Fred W. Gibson Jr., Acting Inspector Gen. for the FDIC 8 (Feb. 17, 2016),
http://www.ballardspahr.com/-/medialfiles/alerts/2016-FDIC-letter-February
[https://perma.cc/V4JV-VEZQ] (disputing many of the OIG's conclusions).
32. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 81 (2008) (lamenting that interest rate exportation has rendered states "powerless to protect
their citizens from such lending practices [rates in excess of a state's cap] going on within their
borders"); Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE
J. REG. 143, 157 (2009) ("Usury laws were historically the major form of consumer protection in
banking because they shielded borrowers from assuming obligations that they could not afford.");
Amanda Katherine Sadie Hill, Note, State Usury Laws: Are They Effective in a Post-GLBA
World?, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 411, 421 (2002) (noting that "[t]he primary public policy reason
supporting usury laws is consumer protection").
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counterproductive at best and a means of rent-seeking by incumbents
at worst.33
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was
concern that interest rate limits too low to attract legal capital for
small loans left borrowers at the mercy of illegal lenders (or "loan
sharks").34  This concern prompted reformers-most notably the
Russell Sage Foundation-to propose changing state laws to allow
lenders to charge significantly higher interest rateS35 in exchange for
complying with certain requirements, including licensing, registration,
and a simplified and limited cost structure that prohibited noninterest
fees.36
This arrangement reflected the realization that to attract and
maintain stable legal lenders, the potential rates of return had to be
sufficient.37 It also reflected the reformers' belief that what made
small loans dangerous was not necessarily their cost, but the lack of
transparency and the loan sharks' use of fraudulent or misleading
terms.38 Lenders that wanted to operate under the new law would be
able to charge more interest than previously allowed but would need
to maintain high levels of transparency and simplicity. 39  These
recommendations took the form of the Uniform Small Loan Law of
1916 (USLL), which was passed in various versions by two-thirds of
states.40 The USLL faced opposition from a classic "bootleggers and
Baptists"4 1 coalition of (1) illegal lenders who feared competition from
33. See Benmelech & Moskowitz, supra note 29, at 1070-71 (arguing that rent-seeking
by incumbents looking to cut off competition for capital better explains the course of state usury
laws in the nineteenth century than the alternative public interest explanation); Miller & Black,
supra note 30, at 344 (asserting that one explanation for interest rate caps is rent-seeking
behavior by those who set them); William Cullen Bryant, Editorial, On Usury Laws, N.Y.
EVENING POST (Sept. 26, 1836), as reprinted in 31 FREEMAN 45 (1981),
https://fee.org/media/16244/1981-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF52-MJPY] (arguing that interest rate
limits harmed the poor by cutting off access, to the benefit of the rich).
34. Bruce G. Carruthers, Timothy W. Guinnane & Yoonseok Lee, Bringing "Honest
Capital" to Poor Borrowers: The Passage of the U.S. Uniform Small Loan Law, 1907-1930, 42 J.
INTERDISC. HIST. 393, 395 (2012); Miller & Black, supra note 30, at 360-61.
35. Carruthers, Guinnane & Lee, supra note 34, at 403; Letter from Thomas W. Miller,
Jr., Todd Zywicki & author, to CFPB for the Rule on Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain
High-Cost Installment Lending (Oct. 7, 2016) (on file with author) (explaining that relevant
interest rates were generally under 10 percent per year, and the Russell Sage Foundation
proposed allowing rates between 36 percent and 42 percent).
36. Carruthers, Guinnane & Lee, supra note 34, at 400.
37. Id. at 403; Miller & Black, supra note 30, at 360-61.
38. Carruthers, Guinnane & Lee, supra note 34, at 403.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 394.
41. The phrase "bootleggers and Baptists" derives from Bruce Yandle's observation that
opposition to pro-competition regulation often is raised by oddly matched partners-civic groups
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legitimate lenders and (2) community advocates who thought the
interest rates allowed by the USLL were too high.4 2 The USLL also
influenced numerous subsequent lending regulations,43 including the
federal Truth in Lending Act.4 4  To this day, states continue to
regulate rates45-and the definition of interest46-for both banks and
nonbank entities, sometimes applying different standards to each.4 7
2. Federal Regulation of Consumer and Small-Business Interest Rates
As the federal government developed a national banking
system to compete with the state-chartered banking system,4 8 it began
to take a greater interest in lending regulation. National banks had to
be able to compete with state-chartered depositories and
nondepository institutions regulated by the states. Congress passed
the National Currency Act of 186349 and its successor statute, the
National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA), 50 to help further the Union's war
effort by increasing the federal government's control over the banking
sector.5 1  These Acts created a national currency, a federal bank
that worry about the public effect (the Baptists) and market participants that worry they will
face increased competition and diminished profit (the bootleggers). Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers
and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7 REG. 12, 13 (1983).
42. See Carruthers, Guinnane & Lee, supra note 34, at 401-02.
43. Id. at 394 n.1 (citing ELIZABETH RENUART, PUB. POLICY INST., PAYDAY LOANS: A
MODEL STATE STATUTE 6 n.6 (2000)).
44. Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-321, §§ 101-45, 82 Stat. 146, 146-59 (1968)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2012)); see Carruthers, Guinnane & Lee, supra
note 34, at 394.
45. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-103 (2017) (providing general interest rate
limits).
46. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-3-1 (2017) (defining what constitutes interest);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-102(8) (same).
47. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-3-13. For example, South Dakota is famous (some
may say infamous) for not having a maximum usury rate for its banks. See id. However, South
Dakota recently applied a 36 percent interest rate to payday and car title loans issued by
nonbank entities. South Dakota Voters Approve Interest Rate Cap on Payday Loans, KSFY (Nov.
8, 2016, 10:30 PM), http://www.ksfy.com/content/news/South-Dakota-voters-approve-interest-
rate-cap-on-payday-loans-400489561.html [https://perma.cc/LU6A-ZN9M].
48. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
314-15 (1978) (discussing the legislative history of the National Bank Act); see also CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1256 (1864) (statement of Rep. Samuel Hooper) (stating the
purpose of the National Bank Act was to "render the law so perfect that the State banks may be
induced to organize under it, in preference to continuing under their State charters").
49. National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (repealed 1864).
50. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 343, § 1, 18 Stat. 123 (1864) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 38 (2012)).
51. Bank Activities and Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 46119, 46120 (proposed Aug. 5, 2003)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 34); see Kirby M. Smith, Banking on Preemption: Allowing
National Bank Act Preemption for Third-Party Sales, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1631, 1633 (2016).
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charter, and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC)-charged with granting charters to and monitoring
federally chartered banks.52
Given the NBA's intent to replace the state-chartered system
with a federal one, the Supreme Court interpreted the NBA as
protecting national banks from "unfriendly legislation by the States"
and "ruinous competition with State banks."5 3 Section 85 of the NBA,
for example, allowed a national bank to either export its home-state
interest rate to any state in which it did business or to use the host
state's rate.54
This interest rate exportation power became especially
important with the rise of credit cards, which allowed banks to easily
lend to borrowers across state lines. In the landmark 1978 case of
Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service
Corp.,55 the Supreme Court held that a bank could charge a borrower
the rate of interest of the state in which the bank-not the
borrower-was located.56  The Court considered and rejected the
argument that extending credit into Minnesota effectively located the
bank there.57 Instead, the Court looked to the bank's charter8 and to
where the bank actually conducted the bulk of its business59 to
determine its location.
Congress, its ardor to replace state banks having cooled, acted
quickly after the Marquette decision to provide parity to federally
insured, state-chartered banks. Section 521 of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDA)60
included language similar to Section 85 of the NBA, and both courts
and regulators have interpreted the provisions in parallel.61 Congress
sought to "allow[] competitive equity among financial institutions, and
reaffirm[] the principle that institutions offering similar products
52. Bank Activities and Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46120.
53. Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 413 (1873); see also Smith,
supra note 51, at 1634-35.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2012); Smith, supra note 51, at 1634.
55. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299
(1978).
56. Id. at 312-13.
57. Id. at 310-13.
58. Id. at 309-11.
59. Id. at 311-12.
60. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, § 521, 94 Stat. 132, 164-65 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (2012)).
61. Greenwood Tr. Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 826-27 (1st Cir. 1992); General
Counsel's Opinion No. 10 on Interest Charges Under Section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 19258, 19259 (Apr. 17, 1998).
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should be subject to similar rules."62 As a result, both federally
insured, state-chartered banks and federally chartered banks can
charge the higher of either the interest rate allowed in their home
state or the rate in the borrower's state.63
Section 85 of the NBA and Section 521 of DIDA allow banks to
export not only the numerical rate of interest, but also the definition of
interest used by their home state.64 In addition, banks enjoy "most
favored lender" status, allowing them to charge the highest rate
available to any lender-not just banks-under a state's laws.65
However, bank regulators have been known to discourage banks from
making high-interest loans that are technically legal but, in the
regulators' view, harmful to consumers or to the safety and soundness
of the bank.66
Meanwhile, the law of the borrower's home state generally
governs the interest nonbank lenders can charge.67 State laws are,
according to Professor Elizabeth Schiltz, "idiosyncratic," without
consistent interest rates or a consistent definition of what constitutes
interest.68 However, the CFPB may be using its authority under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank) to attempt to federalize interest rate regulation.69
Likewise, the recent and controversial Operation Choke Point may
represent an effort by banking regulators to discourage high-interest
62. Greenwood, 971 F.2d at 826 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. 6907 (1980) (statement of Sen.
Bumpers)).
63. Id. at 827.
64. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 743-46 (1996) (holding that a
national bank could charge out-of-state credit card customers interest payments consistent with
OCC reasonable interpretation regarding § 85 and allowed by the bank's home state but
prohibited in states where cardholders reside); 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4001(c), 560.110(c) (2017); General
Counsel's Opinion No. 10 on Interest Charges Under Section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act, 63 Fed. Reg. at 19259 (citing 12 C.F.R §§ 7.4001(a), 560.110(a) (2017)).
65. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4001(b), 560.110(b); General Counsel's Opinion No. 10 on Interest
Charges Under Section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 63 Fed. Reg. at 19259.
66. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 31, at 13. But see Letter from
Doreen R. Eberley & Charles Yi to Fred W. Gibson Jr., supra note 31, at 1-2 (disputing many of
the OIG's conclusions).
67. See e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-103 (2017) (limiting interest that can be charged
under certain circumstances); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1520 (2017) (limiting interest that can be
charged by consumer finance companies in Virginia).
68. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine
and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 525 (2004).
69. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); see infra Part III.A.3.
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loans from nonbank entities by cutting off those lenders' access to
banks.70
3. The Regulation of Marketplace Lending
It was against the backdrop of federal and state regulation that
marketplace lending emerged. Marketplace lending is a broad term
encompassing several recent models of nonbank lending.71
Marketplace lenders share certain characteristics, including use of the
Internet to solicit borrowers (and, in some cases, investors to provide
loan capital), use of proprietary data and algorithms to assess risk,
and use of nondeposit capital to fund loans.72 The first marketplace
lenders directly matched borrowers with members of the public, who
would pledge to fund a portion of the loan in exchange for a fixed-rate
debt security which the borrower's loan backed. However, over time
institutional investors came to play a dominant role in this space,73
which has led to the proliferation of different models. Business
models now include the sale of entire loans to institutional investors,
the securitization of loans into asset-backed securities, and investor
funding of lenders that hold loans on the lenders' own balance
sheets.74 Some lenders originate their loans directly, whereas others
70. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND Gov. REFORM, 113TH CONG., THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S "OPERATION CHOKE POINT": ILLEGALLY CHOKING OFF LEGITIMATE
BUSINESSES? 1 (2014); Alan Zibel & Brent Kendall, Probe Turns up Heat on Banks, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 7, 2013, 10:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/probe-turns-up-heat-on-banks-
1375923859 [https://perma.ccl3U64-7TWH].
71. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
72. Although banks may purchase loans from marketplace lenders-either directly or
via asset-backed securities-with funds generated from deposits, the marketplace lender itself is
a non-depository institution and does not have its own deposits to fund loans. U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN ONLINE MARKETPLACE LENDING 5 (2016)
[hereinafter TREASURY REPORT], https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/
Documents/Opportunities-andChallenges inOnlineMarketplaceLending-white-paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y7UH-GPGR (listing funding sources used by marketplace lenders, including
funds invested by depository institutions but omitting deposits placed with the marketplace
lender itself); Andrew Friedman, WTF Is Marketplace Lending?, TEARSHEET (Apr. 26, 2016),
http://www.tearsheet.co/2016/04/26/what-is-marketplace-lending [https://perma.ccWKC7-V85D].
73. Shelly Banjo, Wall Street Is Hogging the Peer-to-Peer Lending Market, QUARTZ (Mar.
4, 2015), https://qz.com/355848/wall-street-is-hogging-the-peer-to-peer-lending-market/
[https://perma.cc/CD9Z-NV9D]; see, e.g., Prosper Funding LLC, Prospectus for Borrower
Dependent Notes (Form 424B3) 73 (Jan. 12, 2017) (noting whole loans sold to institutional
investors comprised 82 percent of the total loans originated in the quarter that ended Sept. 30,
2016); Lending Club Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 39 (Nov. 11, 2016) (showing of the $2
billion in loans that Lending Club originated in the third quarter of 2016, $1.3 billion, or 65
percent, came from whole loan sales to institutions).
74. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 72, at 5-8.
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partner with a bank to originate the loan that the marketplace lender
then purchases and services.75
Marketplace lending has grown significantly since its
inception.76 It has allowed borrowers and lenders nationwide to access
and extend credit.77 Marketplace lenders compete with banks and
other traditional lenders on cost, speed, and access. Some borrowers
are able to obtain credit more cheaply than they previously could78 or
to obtain credit that traditional sources would have refused to
provide.79 This expanded access to credit is in part because market
lenders do not bear the costs of physical branches and outdated
technological infrastructure.8 0  A lender's cost structure is an
important determinant of the rates the lender can offer borrowers.81
Meanwhile, borrowers turn to marketplace lenders because those
lenders are often faster than traditional lenders.82
Marketplace lenders face exposure to a complex regulatory
environment because of their nonbank status and the Internet's use as
a distribution channel. Moreover, they lack any physical barriers to
75. Id. at 5-6.
76. Id. at 9.
77. ROBERT WARDROP ET AL., BREAKING NEW GROUND: THE AMERICAS ALTERNATIVE
FINANCE BENCHMARKING REPORT 53 (2016), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user-upload/
research/centres/alternative-finance/downloads/20 16-americas-alternative-finance-
benchmarking-report.pdf [https://perma.ce/3P5U-LEGC].
78. Yulia Demyanyk & Daniel Kolliner, Peer-to-Peer Lending Is Poised to Grow, FED.
RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-
events/publications/economic-trends/2014-economic-trends/et-20140814-peer-to-peer-lending-is-
poised-to-grow.aspx [https://perma.cc/GYM9-UZSZ]; see also Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine
Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk Pricing, and Alternative Information 26
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 17-17, 2017), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-
/medialresearch-and-datalpublications/working-papers/2017/wp17-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXL9-
CE87].
79. Usman Ahmed et al., Filling the Gap: How Technology Enables Access to Finance for
Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 10 INNOVATIONS 35, 35-36 (2015) (finding PayPal
Working Capital loans disproportionately disbursed to areas with relatively high declines in the
number of banks and to traditionally underserved populations); see also TREASURY REPORT,
supra note 72, at 21; Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 78, at 19-22.
80. Miklos Dietz et al., Cutting Through the Noise Around Financial Technology,
MCKINSEY & CO. FIN. SERVS. (Feb. 2016), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-
services/our-insights/cutting-through-the-noise-around-financial-technology
[https://perma.cc/4T9N-6K33].
81. THOMAS A. DURKIN, GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & MIN HWANG, RATE CEILINGS AND THE
DISTRIBUTION OF SMALL DOLLAR LOANS FROM CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES: RESULTS OF A
NEW SURVEY OF SMALL DOLLAR CASH LENDERS 5-6 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2533143
[https://perma.ccl7KYD-X37S].
82. Richard D. Olson, Jr., Online Lending: Friend or Foe of Community Bankers?,
COMMUNITIES & BANKING, Fall 2014, at 13, 13, https://www.bostonfed.org/commdev/
c&b/2014/fall/online-lending-friend-or-foe.htm [https://perma.cc/T6TU-NYJC].
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extending credit and raising investment capital nationwide,
possessing the capability for instant scale. However, they face
regulatory barriers. Federal law provides state-chartered and
federally chartered banks ignificant regulatory consistency regarding
what they can charge for loans across state lines.83 By contrast,
marketplace lenders, as nonbank financial companies, face regulatory
inconsistency and duplication. They are subject to federal regulation
in a number of areas: the federal prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or
abusive acts or practices;8 consumer protection laws; fair lending
laws; and the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). 85 But they are also frequently
subject to state-by-state regulations, including usury laws and
licensure requirements.86
Licensing is one area in which banks enjoy broad consistency87
while marketplace lenders face inconsistent, state-by-state regulation.
With the exception of licensing of mortgage lenders,88 state licensing
laws for lenders often vary. States have different rules for which
activities require licensure89 and different substantive legal
requirements for the license. Some lenders cite the lack of regulatory
consistency as a significant problem because it increases complexity
and costs while lowering certainty.90
83. See supra Part III.A.2.
84. 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012).
85. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 201-42, 84 Stat. 1114, 1118-24
(1970) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.); see TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 72, at 36.
86. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 72, at 5; John L. Douglas, New Wine into Old Bottles:
Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory World, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 31-32 (2016).
87. Douglas, supra note 86, at 34.
88. Mortgage lender requirements are relatively more consistent as a result of the
Nationwide Multistate Licensing System and Registry (NMLS), a joint project of the Conference
of State Bank Supervisors and the American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators. See
Douglas, supra note 86, at 33. The Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act
mandated that mortgage loan originators register with NMLS, which helped drive uniformity.
Id.; see Pub. L. No. 110-289, §§ 1501-17, 122 Stat. 2654, 2810-24 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 5101-16 (2012)). Note that mortgages are also subject to a federal law that exempts
them from state usury laws, see 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7, and regulations that impose significant
additional requirements on certain high-cost mortgages, in effect discouraging lenders from
making them, see 12 C.F.R. § 1026.32 (2017).
89. Douglas, supra note 86, at 32.
90. See, e.g., Letter from Manuel P. Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Affirm Inc., to Laura Temel,
Senior Advisor, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury 7 (Sept. 30, 2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=TREAS-DO-2015-0007-0080&
attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/3HLZ-ENHN]; Letter from Sam
Hodges, Co-Founder and U.S. Managing Dir., Funding Circle, & Connor French, Legal &
Regulatory Dir., Funding Circle, to Laura Temel, Senior Advisor, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury 27
(Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=TREAS-DO-2015-
0007-0081&attachmentNumber=l&contentType=pdf [https://perma.ccl7JH9-B656]; Letter from
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The desire for consistency-especially in loan pricing-is one
reason some lenders partner with banks. As discussed above,91 banks
are able to charge consistent interest rates nationwide, permitting
comparable borrowers to be treated alike regardless of the
idiosyncrasies of state law. By partnering with a bank, marketplace
lenders can offer uniform prices and extend credit to borrowers whose
risk profiles necessitate an interest rate above the state limit imposed
on nonbank financial companies. This model relies on two
traditionally well-accepted legal doctrines: the previously mentioned
ability of banks to export interest rates and the common law doctrine
of "valid when made."92 The latter is one of "two cardinal rules in the
doctrine of usury."93 A loan that is not usurious when it is made (in
this case, because of the bank's ability to export its home state interest
rate to the borrower's state) cannot subsequently become usurious
because it is sold to another party-even if that party itself could not
have legally originated the loan.94
Frequently, in the bank partnership model, the marketplace
lender will conduct independent marketing and serve as the intake
point for potential borrowers.9 5 The marketplace lender performs its
own underwriting to assess risk and determines whether to extend a
loan and, if so, at what price.96 If the marketplace lender wishes to
extend credit and its bank partner agrees, the bank will originate the
loan and sell it to the marketplace lender after a short period of
time.97 In some cases, the bank sells the loan directly to a third
Robert S. Lavet, Gen. Counsel, Social Fin., Inc., to Laura Temel, Senior Advisor, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury 3-5 (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=
TREAS-DO-2015-0007-0050&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/DDU2-
9X6X]; Letter from Mitria Wilson, Vice President of Gov't Relations, Oportun, to Office of the
Undersec'y for Domestic Fin., U.S. Dep't of the Treasury 11-13 (Sept. 30, 2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=TREAS-DO-2015-0007-
0084&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/3MM2-F9YE].
91. See supra Part III.A.2.
92. See Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 109 (1833) (describing the foundation for
the "valid when made" doctrine).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 110.
95. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 72, at 6-9.
96. Id.; see also Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Richard Squire, How Does
Legal Enforceability Affect Consumer Lending? Evidence from a Natural Experiment 13
(Columbia Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 16-38, 2017), https://ssrn.comlabstract=2780215
[https://perma.cc/AN2D-7S2U].
97. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 72, at 6; Letter from Renaude Laplanche, Founder &
CEO, Lending Club, to Laura Temel, Senior Advisor, U.S. Dep't of Treasury 8 (Sept. 30, 2015),
http://ir.lendingclub.com/interactivellookandfeel/4213397/LendingClubResponseToTreasuryRFI.
pdf [https://perma.cclY248-9YHS] (responding to the Treasury Department's request for
information on marketplace lending).
2017] 145
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
party.9 8 The marketplace lender services the loan, either on its own
behalf or on behalf of the purchaser of the loan.99
This bank partnership model has come under pressure recently
from both the courts and state regulators. The recent case of Madden
v. Midland Funding, LLC100 calls into question the ability of banks to
sell loans to nonbank entities that service the loans on the original
loan terms. In Madden, a borrower sued a debt-buying service,
claiming that the debt was usurious and therefore invalid under New
York law.101 The borrower executed a credit card contract with a
federally chartered bank, using an interest rate under the bank's
home state law.102 The borrowers account was then sold to another
federally chartered bank.103 The borrower subsequently defaulted, her
debt was declared nonperforming, and the loan was sold.104
The debt purchaser, Midland Funding, tried to collect the debt
under the terms of the original contract, including interest accrued at
the original interest rate of 27 percent10 5-a rate in excess of New
York's 25 percent limit. 106  The borrower argued that Midland
Funding was not entitled to interest that accrued after it purchased
the debt because it was not a bank and therefore was not able to take
advantage of the NBA's interest rate export provision.107 Midland
Funding maintained that, as assignee of a national bank's debt, it was
entitled to preemption under the NBA.10 8
The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sided with the
borrower, finding that the nonbank debt buyer was neither covered by
the NBA nor able to administer the contract on the same terms as the
bank.109  The court reasoned that preventing a nonbank debt
purchaser from enforcing loans on the same terms as the bank that
made and sold the loan did not sufficiently impair the bank's powers1 o
to trigger the NBA's preemption of New York's usury statute.'
98. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 72, at 6.
99. Id.; see also Honigsberg, Jackson & Squire, supra note 96, at 14.
100. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015).
101. Id. at 248.
102. Id. at 247-48.




107. Id. at 249.
108. Id. at 250.
109. Id. at 249.
110. Id. at 251.
111. Id. at 249.
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The Office of the Solicitor General and the OCC strongly
criticized the Second Circuit's decision as a misunderstanding of the
law and precedent.112 They argued that the power of banks under the
NBA to make a loan includes the power to sell the loan to a nonbank
entity and have the loan remain valid.113
Even though Madden did not involve a marketplace lender, it
has clear implications for marketplace lending. Marketplace lenders
that partner with banks are in a somewhat similar position to the
defendant in Madden, and the validity of loans that could violate
usury laws in New York, Connecticut, and Vermont (the states
covered by the Second Circuit) can no longer be assumed. Some
marketplace lenders initially represented to investors that contractual
choice-of-law provisions applying Utah law (which excludes interest
rate caps) would be sufficient to avoid any impact from Madden.114
However, lenders have changed the structure of their partnerships
with banks to let the bank retain an interest in the loan's
performance, likely as a way to protect against preemption
questions.115
The market seems less confident that such a choice-of-law
approach rests on solid legal ground.116 As evidence of the market's
uncertainty, the amount of investment pledged to loans with interest
rates in excess of state usury caps in the states covered by the Second
Circuit has declined significantly after Madden, despite growth in
states not covered by that decision.117 After the Supreme Court's
refusal to hear the case, concern has grown about credit access for
risky borrowers. A bill was introduced in Congress in 2016 to codify
112. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, Midland
Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016) (No. 15-610).
113. Id. at 7.
114. See Sean Murray, Renaud Laplanche on Madden v. Midland, DEBANKED (Aug. 8,
2015), http://debanked.com/2015/08/renaud-laplanche-on-madden-v-midland [https://perma.cc/
M23E-YQ2D].
115. Smith, supra note 51, at 1680.
116. Joseph Cioffi & Massimo Giugliano, Spotlight Remains on Marketplace Lenders Post-
Madden, LAW360 (July 13, 2016, 4:13 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/816802/spotlight-
remains-on-marketplace-lenders-post- madden [https://perma.cc/G2UL-RQVD] ("Lenders could
include a choice-of-law provision in their loan agreements that mandate[s] the application of the
originating bank's home state's laws, including usury laws. The effectiveness of such a provision
may be case-specific, however, because a borrower may overcome it by demonstrating that
application of the chosen law would undermine a fundamental policy of the borrower's home
state."); see also Douglas, supra note 86, at 31 (noting that choice-of-law provisions "must bear
some substantial relationship to the transaction.").
117. Honigsberg, Jackson & Squire, supra note 96, at 27-29.
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the "valid when made" principle,118 but it failed to pass. However, in
2017 similar provisions have been introduced in the House and
Senate.119
Although Madden's impact on marketplace lending may be
somewhat indirect, it has prompted at least one suit that directly
takes aim at the bank partnership model. Bethune v. LendingClub
Corp. is a civil suit by a borrower who accused Lending Club of
engaging in corrupt practices.120 The borrower alleges that Lending
Club, which purchases and services loans originated by its bank
partners, was the "true lender" and merely used the banks as a
"sham" to evade New York usury law.121 The complaint cites Madden
for the proposition that Lending Club, a nonbank lender, is unable to
issue or service the loans it purchases from its bank partners when
those loans have interest rates higher than the rate cap in the
borrower's home state.122 The plaintiff sought to form a class of
similarly situated borrowers,123 but the defendants successfully
argued that the case must be sent to arbitration under the terms of
the plaintiffs loan.12 4
Bethune raises two different regulatory questions facing
marketplace lenders. One is the previously mentioned question about
the validity of loans sold by banks to nonbank entities.125 The other
question relates to the "true lender" doctrine, under which the court
looks past the statements of the parties to the economic reality of the
transaction, in order to determine the actual lender-and therefore
what law applies. In Madden, there was no dispute that the original
lender was a bank that made the loan for its own purposes, retained
118. The Protecting Consumers' Access to Credit Act of 2016 was introduced by Rep.
Patrick McHenry on July 11, 2016. See H.R. 5724, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016).
119. See, e.g., H.R. 3299, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 3280, 115th Cong. § 925 (2017); H.R.
10, 115th Cong. § 581 (2017); see also S. 1642, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing an identical version
of H.R. 3299 in the US Senate). See generally Memorandum from Jeb Hensarling, Chairman,
Comm. on Fin. Servs., to the Fin. Servs. Comm. Leadership Team 5 (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.cfpbmonitor.comlwp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/02/CHOICE.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MZ63-U6Q3] (proposing to amend the Financial CHOICE Act with language
taken from H.R. 5724).
120. Bethune v. LendingClub Corp., No. 16 CIV. 2578 (NRB), 2017 WL 462287, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2017).
121. Complaint ¶¶ 11-17, Bethune, 2017 WL 462287, ECF No. 1.
122. Id. 1 50.
123. Id. ¶¶ 63-73.
124. Bethune, 2017 WL 462287, at *1; see Robert Loeb et al., Class Action Against
Lending Club and WebBank Headed to Defeat, ORRICK (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.orrick.com/Insights/2017/01/Class-Action-Against-Lending-Club-and-WebBank-
Headed-to-Defeat [https://perma.cclR9ZQ-YSDC].
125. See supra text accompanying notes 100-22.
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the loan and relationship for a period of time, and disposed of the loan
only after the loan had ceased to perform.126 By contrast, the plaintiff
in Bethune argues that the originating bank was a mere tool of
Lending Club, the entity that makes the actual decisions, funds the
loans, and owns the relationship.12 7
Disgruntled borrowers are not the only parties raising true
lender issues in marketplace lending. For example, regulators in New
York128 and California 29 have begun making inquiries of marketplace
lenders. Vermont has passed a law requiring "loan solicitors," which
would likely include marketplace lenders, to be licensed and regulated
by the state.130 Additionally, regulators in Colorado have sued two
marketplace lenders, arguing that Colorado law applies to the
loan-despite the fact it was initially made by a bank-on the grounds
that the bank is unable to sell the loan and the marketplace lenders
are the true lenders.131 Identifying the true lender is particularly
important for state regulators: if the true lender is a bank, state
regulators may be significantly limited by federal preemption; on the
other hand, if the true lender is a nonbank entity, state regulators
have significantly more authority and flexibility. 132
Additionally, the CFPB has begun to make interest rate limits
a subject of federal regulation. Although Dodd-Frank prohibits the
CFPB from imposing an interest rate limit without explicit
authorization from Congress,133 the CFPB has begun to nibble at the
edges. In its Proposed Rule on Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain
126. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 247-48 (2d Cir. 2015).
127. Complaint, supra note 121, ¶¶ 11-17.
128. Suzanne Barlyn, Exclusive: New York Financial Regulator Gearing Up to Probe
Online Lenders, REUTERS (May 26, 2016, 6:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lending-
new-york-probe-exclusive-idUSKCNOYG310 [https://perma.cc/6ND8-4MHL].
129. Consumer Fin. Servs. Grp., California Launches Marketplace Lending, Merchant
Cash Advance Inquiry, BALLARD SPAHR (Dec. 21, 2015),
http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2015-12-21-california-launches-
marketplace-lending-merchant-cash-advance-inquiry.aspx [https://perma.cclK8AU-89KM].
130. Vermont Licenses and Regulates Loan Solicitors Including Lead Generators,
COUNSELORLIBR. (May 5, 2017), https://www.counselorlibrary.net/public/alert.cfm?itemID=2420
[https://perma.cc/2JDR-2UT3].
131. Complaint ¶¶ 29-35, Meade v. Avant of Colo. LLC, No. 17CV30377 (D. Colo. Feb. 15,
2017), https://www.scribd.com/document/344289556/Colorado-v-Avant [https://perma.cc/GST5
-JA9L]; Complaint ¶¶ 27-33, Meade v. Marlette Funding LLC, No. 17CV30376 (D. Colo. Feb. 15,
2017), https://www.scribd.com/document/344289584/Colorado-v-Marlette [https://perma.cc/
9VRD-YXVG].
132. Douglas, supra note 86, at 31-32, 34.
133. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1027, 124 Stat. 1376, 1995 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5517(o) (2012)).
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High-Cost Installment Loans (Payday Rule),134 the CFPB proposed
that certain loans with a total annual cost of credit exceeding 36
percent be subject to considerable disclosure and procedural
requirements, which would likely render many of those loans
infeasible.135 Such loans include those with which the lender has a
lien or "leveraged payment mechanism" that allows the lender to
automatically take payment from the borrower's bank account.136 The
Payday Rule, if adopted in its proposed form, could implicate many of
the loans made by marketplace lenders because of the lenders' use of
the Automated Clearing House (ACH) to "pull" the borrower's
payments.
Recently, the CFPB also successfully applied the true lender
doctrine to nonbank entities that partner with Native American tribes
to issue loans in excess of the borrower's state usury cap, arguing that
those loans could violate Dodd-Frank's prohibition on unfair,
deceptive, and abusive acts or practices.137 In CFPB v. CashCall, Inc.,
the US District Court for the Central District of California granted
summary judgment to the CFPB, holding that CashCall, a lender that
prefunded and purchased loans issued by Western Sky Financial-a
corporation operating under the laws of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe (CRST)-was the true lender.138 The loan contracts contained a
choice-of-law provision stipulating that the CRST law would govern
the contracts,1 3 9 while Western Sky personnel conducted underwriting
and made lending decisions.140 The court nevertheless found that
CashCall was the true lender.141 It did so by applying a "totality of the
circumstances" test.142
The court looked at the underlying economics of the transaction
and found that CashCall bore the entire risk of the transaction;
Western Sky was insulated from the risk that loans would default
both contractually and via a prefunded pool of money provided by
134. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 47864
(proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
135. Id. at 47912-13; see Tom Miller, Todd Zwyicki & Brian Knight, Comment Letter on
the CFPB's Proposed Rule on Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans
11, 13 (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-0025-143372
[https://perma.cc/AQ9R-XSZJI.
136. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. at
47864.
137. CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL 4820635, at *4, *13
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016).
138. Id. at *5-6.
139. Id. at *3.
140. Id.




CashCall to cover the next two days' worth of loans.143 The court then
found that the choice-of-law provision in the contract was invalid
because the CRST lacked a sufficient connection to the transaction to
justify using the tribe's law.144 Although lending decisions were made
on CRST property and the court acknowledged that the law of
California (CashCall's home state) could arguably apply, the court
held that the law of the borrowers' home state should apply.145 The
court reasoned that the borrowers applied for, paid for, and received
the funds from the loans in their home states; therefore, their home
states' law should apply because these states had the most important
interest in the transaction.146
The applicability of the true lender doctrine in the context of
marketplace lending is muddled.147 In determining the true lender's
identity, some courts-such as the Central District of California in
CFPB v. CashCall-look to the totality of the circumstances and seek
to determine who has the "predominant economic interest" in the loan
at its creation.148 Other courts look to the legal structure of the
arrangement as the guiding principle.149 One such court cited the
concern that making a judgment on the basis of subjective intent
instead of legal form is too uncertain and inconsistent with federal
banking law's intent to exempt banks from state usury laws.150 It is
unclear how courts will apply the true lender doctrine to marketplace
lenders using a bank partnership. Likewise, the CFPB's use of federal
law to penalize violations of state usury caps could represent a path to
federalization of interest rate regulation, though it too remains
unclear how extensively this strategy will be pursued. As they did in
143. Id.
144. Id. at *7.
145. Id. at *9.
146. Id. at *8. This analysis appears inconsistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in
Marquette, where the Court found that the lender's home state should control despite borrowers
applying for, receiving, and paying for credit from their home states. Marquette Nat'l Bank of
Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 299-300 (1978).
147. See Richard P. Eckman & Ashleigh K. Reibach, True Lender Issues Cloud the Future
of Marketplace Lending, PEPPER HAMILTON (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.pepperlaw.com/
publications/true-lender-issues-cloud-the-future-of-marketplace-lending-2014-12-09
[https://perma.cc/MG72-4PKZ].
148. CashCall, 2016 WL 4820635, at *6, *13; see CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No. 12-1274,
2014 W. Va. LEXIS 587, at *41 (W. Va. May 30, 2014); Spitzer v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach,
846 N.Y.S.2d 436, 439 (App. Div. 2007).
149. See, e.g., Krispin v. May Dep't Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2000);
Beechum v. Navient Sols., Inc., No. EDCV 15-8239-JGB-KKx, 2016 WL 5340454, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 20, 2016); Sawyer v. Bill Me Later, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1368-69 (D. Utah 2014);
Hudson v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 01-1336-C, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11226, at *16 (S.D.
Ind. May 30, 2002).
150. Hudson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11226, at *16.
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reaction to the Madden decision, some marketplace lenders with bank
partnerships-in an effort to avoid true lender issues-have been
changing their arrangements so that the bank's compensation is tied
to performance over the life of the loan. 151
One way around the question of the true lender's identity is to
allow marketplace lenders to become "banks" themselves. That
possibility has been suggested to the Treasury Department in
response to its request for information on marketplace lending.152
That suggestion was also made to the OCC in response to its white
paper Supporting Responsible Innovation in the Federal Banking
System.153 The OCC has supported this view and announced it would
offer a Special Purpose National Bank charter to fintech firms.154
Supporters of this approach include those in the financial services
industry,155 policy professionals,15 6 and some consumer advocates.15 7
151. Kevin Wack, Lending Club Tweaks Business Model in Effort to Thwart Legal
Challenges, AM. BANKER (Feb. 26, 2016, 5:54 PM), https://www.americanbanker.coml
news/lending-club-tweaks-business-model-in-effort-to-thwart-legal-challenges
[https://perma.cclHV96-8VWS].
152. Letter from author & Staci Warden, Milken Inst. Ctr. for Fin. Mkts., to Laura Temel,
Senior Advisor, U.S. Dep't of Treasury 10-11 (Sept. 28, 2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=TREAS-DO-2015-0007-
0023&attachmentNumber=l&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/685L-KQ7E]; Letter from
Robert S. Lavet to Laura Temel, supra note 90, at 3-5.
153. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE
BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 2, 3 n.1 (2016) (citing OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN
OCC PERSPECTIVE (2016)), https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/special-
purpose-national-bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RA9-XNKW].
154. Id. at 2.
155. Letter from Joan Aristei, Vice President, Opurtun, Inc., to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency 3 (May 31, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-
innovation/comments/oportun-response-to-occ-responsible-innovation.pdf [https://perma.cclFF4Y-
NCK6]; Letter from John A. Beccia, Gen. Counsel, Circle Internet Fin., Inc., to Thomas J. Curry.
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 5 (May 31, 2016),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/comment-circle-financial.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82DY-NBJQ]; Letter from Robert S. Lavet to Laura Temel, supra note 90, at
3-5; Letter from Juan Suarez, Counsel, Coinbase Inc., to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency 4-5 (June 1, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/
comments/comment-coinbase-letter.pdf [https://perma.cclFX5B-SPQM]; Letter from Ryan
Zagone, Dir. of Regulatory Relations, Ripple, to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 3
(May 30, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/comments-
ryan-zagone.pdf [https://perma.cc/6P4V-YXG6].
156. Letter from author, Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason Univ., to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency 7-8 (May 12, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-
innovation/comments/comments-brian-knight.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3K4-YVVU]; Letter from
Jackson Mueller & Staci Warden, Milken Inst. Ctr. for Fin. Mkts., to Thomas J. Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 5-6 (Jan. 15, 2017),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/comment-letter-milken.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6PJS-VALQ]; Letter from Peter Van Valkenberg & Jerry Brito, Coin Ctr., to the
152
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The proposed fintech charter has met resistance from the
states-which have filed suit to block the OCC158-as well as some
incumbents159 and consumer advocates.160 The OCC has announced
that it will offer charters to fintech companies, including marketplace
lenders.161 It remains unclear, however, whether the charter as
implemented will be a viable option for many companies.
- B. Money Transmission
As with lending, considerable technological innovation has
recently occurred in the transmission of money. The Internet,
smartphones, and the digitization of money have made it possible to
replace traditional intermediaries, such as bank branches or Western
Union agents, with (as far as the consumer can tell) direct access
without regard for.distance between parties. Lower costs of entry
have also made providing money transmission services on a large
scale more viable, both for new businesses that lack other products to
complement or cross-subsidize money transmission (as banks have
done in the past) and for the established agent networks traditionally
used by companies such as Western Union.
Players in the money transmission space include traditional
financial firms,162 large technology companies that specialize in
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 9-10 (May 27, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov
/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/comment-coin-center.pdf [https://perma.cc[RK7F-
TXHQ].
157. Letter from Jennifer Tescher, Ctr. for Fin. Servs. Innovation, to Thomas J. Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 11 (May 31, 2016),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/comments-cfsi.pdf
[https://perma.cclAQB8-4VU2].
158. Complaint, Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, No. 1:17-cv-00763, 2017 WL 1488257 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2017).
159. Letter from Karen M. Thomas, Senior Exec. Vice President, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of
Am., to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
2-3 (May 31, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/comment-
icba.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ57-Q7Q5].
160. Letter from the Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the
Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 7-8 (May 31, 2016),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/comments-fintech-nclc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C9TA-QZ9D].
161. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 153, at 11.
162. Such firms include traditional credit card networks such as American Express. See,
e.g., COMMONWEALTH OF VA. BUREAU OF FIN. INSTS., MONEY TRANSMITTER LICENSEES 1 (2017)
[hereinafter MONEY TRANSMITTER LICENSEES], https://www.sc.virginia.gov/bfi/reg-inst/trans.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7HFM-EAAL]. They also include networks of banks, as exemplified by Zelle, a
payments network ultimately owned by seven large US banks. See Sarah Perez, Zelle, the
Real-Time Venmo Competitor Backed by Over 30 U.S. Banks, Arrives this Month, TECH CRUNCH
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moving money,163 large firms whose interest in money transmission
may be incidental or derived from their core businesses,1 64 and new
insurgent companies.165 Although many of those firms offer products
that leverage existing payment systems, such as credit card networks
or the ACH,1 66 others use proprietary systems that seek to offer better
and faster service. New digital currencies, such as Bitcoin, exist as
well. Those currencies also compete in money transmission and
introduce unique regulatory issues.1 6 7
Certain financial technology companies, including PayPal,
Google, and Microsoft, have registered with the Department of
Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and
with some states as money services businesses;16 8 others, such as
Apple, have not.169  The determining factor governing FinCEN's
registration requirements is whether the service allows the user to
(June 12, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/12/zelle-the-real-time-venmo-competitor-backed-
by-over-30-u-s-banks-arrives-this-month [ ttps://perma.cc/JFB7-7266].
163. See, e.g., Who We Are, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/about
[https://perma.cclC4L5-QZ5Q] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
164. See, e.g., AMAZON PAY, https://pay.amazon.com/us [https://perma.cclWN6H-5JLR
(last visited Sept. 29, 2017); APPLE PAY, http://www.apple.com/apple-pay
[https://perma.cclWDR6-UHSR] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
165. See, e.g., DWOLLA, https://www.dwolla.com [https://perma.cclUM5C-YB9G] (last
visited Sept. 29, 2017); RIPPLE, https://ripple.com [https://perma.cc/9PHD-EAYW] (last visited
Sept. 29, 2017).
166. The ACH is a network that banks use to move funds between accounts. It is
frequently used for direct deposits (e.g., a paycheck) or direct payments (e.g., automatic bill pay).
For more information, see the network's website at NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/news/what-
ach-quick-facts-about-automated-clearing-house-ach-network [https://perma.cc/4P2K-4NWD]
(last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
167. See, e.g., BITCOIN, https:/Ifbitcoin.org/en [https://perma.cc/73M6-N8LW] (last visited
Sept. 29, 2017). This Article focuses on the regulation of money transmitters, not money
transmission (e.g., limits on liability for fraudulent transfers).
168. FinCEN's registrant search confirms the registration of these three companies. See
MSB Registrant Search, FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/financial-institutions/msb/
msbstateselector.html [https://perma.cc/FDN9-S2U3] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). With respect
to state registration, PayPal and Google are, for example, registered in the Commonwealth of
Virginia. See MONEY TRANSMITTER LICENSEES, supra note 162, at 3. All three companies are also
registered in Idaho. See Money Transmitters, IDAHO DEP'T OF FIN.,
http://www.finance.idaho.govfMoneyTransmitter/MoneyTransmitterLicense.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3KTJ-QMCF] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
169. Samuel Rubenfeld, Apple Pay Faces Lighter Compliance Than PayPal, Google, WALL
ST. J.: BLOG (Oct. 20, 2014, 5:45 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/10/20/why-
apple-pay-faces-lighter-compliance-than-paypal-google [https://perma.ce/6MYP-G788]. However,
Apple has recently announced a peer-to-peer payment functionality that may include Apple
holding customer funds, which could require Apple registering. See Jason Del Rey, Apple Just





store value or is merely a means of conveying payment credential
information.170 PayPal users, for example, can store money with
PayPal as unsecured creditors of PayPal,171 whereas Apple Pay, at
least so far, stores credit card and debit card credentials securely and
allows them to be communicated to merchants, but it does not hold
customer money.172
Money transmission operates in a hybrid regulatory
environment governed by both state and federal law. In general,
federal regulation is more concerned with preventing money
laundering and other criminal abuses of the payments system than it
is with consumer protection.173 By contrast, state laws are more
concerned with consumer protection and the safety and soundness of
the service provider.174 However, the federal government, through the
CFPB, is expressing increased interest in consumer protection
regarding the money transmission context.
How money transmission is regulated depends on who provides
the service. State money transmittal statutes,17 5 which are otherwise
extremely broad,1 76 often exempt banks.17 7 These laws potentially
sweep in a lot of activity beyond traditional money transmission, such
as a courier service moving a store of value (for example, a check or
cash) between parties.17 8 As such, nonbank entities providing money
transfer or payments services, which are subject to state-by-state
regulation, may find themselves under a different-and much less
consistent-regulatory regime than their bank competitors.
170. Rubenfeld, supra note 169.
171. User Agreement, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/ual
useragreement-fullbnr=o#5 [https://perma.cclVE6L-7XY9] (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
172. APPLE PAY, supra note 164.
173. Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77, 86 (2013).
174. Id. at 85-86.
175. Id. at 89; see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-204 (2017) (exempting from money
transmitter regulations only the US government, the State of Tennessee, banks, credit unions,
and certain insurance transactions); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1902 (2017) (exempting the US
government, other states, agents of the government, banks and credit unions, and private
security services businesses that are licensed to transport money).
176. Tu, supra note 173, at 87-88.
177. Id. at 89; see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-204; VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1902.
178. Tu, supra note 173, at 87-88.
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1. State Regulation of Money Transmission
State laws regulating money transmission tend to be broadly
applicable1 79 with limited exemptions.18 0 State regulation of money
transmitters has traditionally focused on protecting consumers and
ensuring that money transmitters are sufficiently safe and sound to
avoid failure.18 1 As such, these laws often include provisions that limit
who can be a money transmitter on the basis of factors such as
criminal history,182 net worth of licensee,183 and general character,
fitness, and competence.184 For example, some states require a surety
bond or equivalent with the application.18 5 Money transmitters are
generally charged a licensing fee or periodic assessments by the
state.1 86 Also, they are generally subject to periodic examination8 7
and requirements to file reports with the state regulator-either on a
179. Id.; see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-202(a); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1901 (requiring a
license for anyone engaged in the business of money transmission, regardless of whether the
money transmitter has a location in Virginia).
180. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-204 (exempting from money transmitter regulations only
the US Government, the state of Tennessee, banks and credit unions, and certain insurance
transactions); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1902 (exempting the US government, other states, agents of
the government, banks and credit unions, and private security services businesses that are
licensed to transport money); Tu, supra note 173, at 89-91.
181. Tu, supra note 173, at 85-86.
182. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-205(c) (prohibiting issuance of a money
transmitter license if certain persons affiliated with the company were convicted of a felony
within the past 10 years, subject to the discretion of the Tennessee Commissioner of Financial
Institutions); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1906(A)(1) (requiring that the character of the applicant and
its control people is such that there is reason to believe the business will be operated fairly).
183. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-205(a) (requiring a $100,000 minimum net worth
for the company plus an additional $25,000 per additional location or agent located in Tennessee,
up to $500,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1906(B) (requiring $200,000 minimum net worth of
licensee).
184. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1906(A)(1)-(2) (requiring that a potential licensee be
"able to and will perform its obligations" and have the "financial responsibility, character,
reputation, experience, and general fitness" to perform its duties).
185. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-208(a) (requiring applications be accompanied by a
$50,000 surety bond or equivalent device, with an additional $10,000 per location, up to a
maximum of $800,000).
186. See, e.g., id. § 45-7-209 (requiring an application fee of between $250 and $500); VA.
CODE ANN. § 6.2-1905(A) (stipulating a $750 annual fee); id. § 6.2-1905(B) (stipulating annual
assessment to defray costs of examination).
187. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-214; VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1910(A); CONFERENCE OF STATE
BANK SUPERVISORS & MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS Ass'N, THE STATE OF STATE MONEY
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regular basis"18 or in response to certain events189-that include
information on the money transmitter's financial condition and
operations. If the examination or reports indicate that the business is
not performing its duties or is in danger of failing, the regulator can
mandate corrective action or suspend or revoke the license.19 0
Responding to a call from Congress,191 the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws completed the Uniform
Money Services Act in 2000.192 To date, it has been adopted by only
ten states, as well as Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.193 The
remaining states194 maintain their own unique laws with varying
substantive requirements.19 5
Although state laws differ, state regulators have made an effort
to coordinate their supervision of money transmitters that operate in
188. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-211(d)(1)-(7) (requiring that licenses be renewed
yearly and that renewal applications contain a report of the licensee's financial condition,
including, inter alia, financial statements, list of locations and agents, and notification of any
"material litigation or litigation relating to money transmission"); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1905(D)
(requiring annual reports, including audited financials).
189. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-212 (requiring a licensed money transmitter to
notify the state after certain events, including bankruptcy, felony indictment of certain parties
related to the firm, and revocation of the firm's license by any state or governmental authority);
VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1917 (requiring a money transmitter to notify the state if certain events
occur, including material changes to information provided in the firm's application, a filing for
bankruptcy, and the indictment of certain parties related to the firm).
190. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-217; VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1907; STATE BANK
REGULATORS REPORT, supra note 187, at 10-11.
191. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-325, § 407(b)(1)-(5), 108 Stat. 2160, 2248 (1994) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §
5311 (2012)).
192. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
amended 2004), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/does/money%20services/umsa-finalO4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E47J-P9KR].
193. The ten states that have adopted the Uniform Money Services Act at the time of this
writing are Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Iowa, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Texas, Vermont, and Washington. See Enactment Status Map, UNIF. L. COMM'N,
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Money%20Services%2OAct [https://perma.cc/3P6Z-RPKJ]
(last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
194. Melanie Baravik, South Carolina Money Transmitters Now Need Bond, SURETY
BOND INSIDER (June 17, 2016), https://www.suretybonds.com/blog/south-carolina- money-
transmitters-now-need-bond/13848 [https://perma.cc/QH5Y-FK2P] (noting that only Montana
has yet to regulate money transmitters).
195. Tu, supra note 173, at 91, 110. See generally THOMAS BROWN, 50-STATE SURVEY:
MONEY TRANSMITTER LICENSING REQUIREMENTS, http://abnk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/
abnk.assembly.ca.gov/files/50%2OState%2OSurvey%20%20MTL%2OLicensing%2ORequirements
(729868034).pdf [https://perma.cclPCX4-Q336] (cataloguing the licensing and investigation
requirements for money transmitters within each state).
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multiple states.196 The Money Transmitter Regulators Association
(MTRA) and Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) have
developed multiple frameworks, including the Money Transmitter
Regulatory Cooperative Agreement;1 9 7 the MTRA Examination
Protocol;198 the joint CSPS-MTRA Nationwide Cooperative Agreement
for MSB Supervision,199 which has been signed by forty-eight states
and territories;200 and the Protocol for Performing Multi-State
Examinations.2 0 1 In 2015, 149 examinations of multistate money
services businesses were conducted, of which sixty-eight were
administered by a multistate examination team.202 Twenty-six states
participated in the joint examinations.2 0 3
2. Federal Regulation of Money Transmission
Federal regulation of money transmitters traditionally has
been primarily concerned with preventing criminals from using the
payments system to facilitate crimes, including laundering illicit
proceeds and funding criminal or terrorist activities.204 The BSA is a
196. MTRA Cooperative Agreement, MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS ASS'N,
http://www.mtraweb.org/about/cooperative-agreement [https://perma.cc/2DAZ-HHUB] (last
visited Oct. 17, 2017) ("The purpose of this agreement is to promote a nationwide framework for
cooperation and coordination among state money transmitter regulators that have concurrent
jurisdiction over a regulated entity in a manner that conserves regulatory resources and
minimizes the regulatory burden on supervised entities, consistent with each state attaining its
supervisory objectives.").
197. See id.
198. See STATE BANK REGULATORS REPORT, supra note 187, at 11.
199. See MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS ASS'N, NATIONWIDE COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENT FOR MSB SUPERVISION 2 (2012), https://www.csbs.org/regulatory/Cooperative-
Agreements/Documents/MSB/MSB-CooperativeAgreementO10512clean.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KPH-7MWB].
200. MSB Ratification Map, CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS (Oct. 24, 2014),
https://www.csbs.org/regulatory/Cooperative-
Agreements/DocumentsMSB/MSB%20Ratification%2OMap%2010.24.14.pptx
[https://perma.cc[BF25-4UZ3]. The states that have not signed the agreement are Colorado,
Maine, Montana, New Mexico, and South Carolina. See id.
201. See MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS Ass'N, PROTOCOL FOR PERFORMING
MULTI-STATE EXAMINATIONS 2 (2012), https://www.csbs.org/regulatory/Cooperative-
Agreements/Documents/MSB/MSB-ProtocollO10512.pdf [https://perma.ccX3UW-YTZZ].
202. STATE BANK REGULATORS REPORT, supra note 187, at 12.
203. Id.
204. Tu, supra note 173, at 95; see also, e.g., Bank Secrecy Act (BSA): Combating Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/compliance-bsalbsalindex-bsa.html [https://perma.cc/R7BW-
Y5ZA] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) (detailing the OCC's responsibility to assist law enforcement
in deterring and detecting "money laundering, terrorist financing and other criminal acts").
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major source of federal regulation of money transmitters.20 5 The BSA
applies to all "financial institutions," which is defined broadly to
include "licensed sender[s] of money or any other person who engages
as a business in the transmission of funds."206  FinCEN, which
manages BSA enforcement,207 made the coverage more explicit in its
regulations. FinCEN defines "financial institutions" to include money
services businesses,208 and "money services businesses" to include,
inter alia, money transmitters.2 0 9 As such, money transmitters are
required to comply with the BSA's requirements. Money transmitters
are required to register with the Treasury Department within 180
days of founding.210  Federal anti-money-laundering law requires
financial institutions to provide information to the government211 and
to retain information on their customers,212 which can be a significant
burden on the companies.213 Federal law also imposes criminal
penalties on firms and individuals that violate state law by operating
money transmission businesses without a state license.214
Title X of Dodd-Frank215 applies to any entity that "engages in
offering or providing a consumer financial product or service,"216 which
the CFPB has interpreted in at least two cases to include money
transmittal services.217 Consequently, substantive federal consumer
protection law may become a greater part of the regulatory
environment for nonbank money transmitters. Recently, the CFPB
entered into a consent order with Dwolla,218 a technology provider that
is not a money transmitter but serves as an agent of financial
205. See Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 201-42, 84 Stat. 1114, 1118-24
(1970) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.); Bank Secrecy Act,
supra note 204.
206. 31 U.S.C § 5312(a)(2)(R) (2012); Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 204.
207. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810(a) (2017).
208. Id. § 1010.100(t)(3); Tu, supra note 173, at 95-96.
209. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5).
210. 31 U.S.C § 5330(a)(1).
211. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 1010.300-.370.
212. See, e.g., id. § 1010.400-440.
213. Daniel P. Stipano, Opinion, Time to Bring BSA into this Century, AM. BANKER (Feb.
21, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/time-to-bring-bsa-into-this-century
[https://perma.cc/3VUW-DEP2].
214. 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2012); Brian Klein, Does 18 U.S.C. § 1960 Create Felony Liability
for Bitcoin Businesses?, COIN CTR. (July 21, 2015), http://coincenter.org/entry/does-18-u-s-c-1960-
create-felony-liability-for-bitcoin-businesses [https://perma.cc/FLD8-FX85].
215. Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1001-1100H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
216. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6)(A) (2012).
217. See, e.g., Dwolla, Inc., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0007, ¶ 5 (Mar. 2, 2016); Complaint ¶ 9,
CFPB v. Intercept Corp., No. 3:16-cv-00144-ARS (D.N.D. June 6, 2016).
218. See Dwolla, Inc., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0007 (Mar. 2, 2016).
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institutions.219 The CFPB alleged that Dwolla misrepresented the
quality of its cybersecurity practices.220 The CFPB further argued
that the misrepresentation was deceptive under Dodd-Frank's
prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.221
Dwolla was ordered to change its procedures to improve security222
and to pay a civil fine.2 2 3  The CFPB has also sued Intercept
Corporation-a payments processing firm that provides services to
payday lenders, debt collectors, and other consumer finance
companies-as well as some of its officers and owners for violations of
Dodd-Frank.224 The CFPB alleged that Intercept processed numerous
payments for transactions that it knew or should have known were
illegal because of the high number of returned payments and other
"red flags."2 2 5  This argument represents a possible significant
expansion of the scope of the CFPB's jurisdiction, given that Intercept
did not directly interact with consumers.226
Federal banking regulators have also pressured banks to deny
services, including money transmission, to certain clients. Operation
Choke Point, a project of the Department of Justice and federal
banking regulators, targeted banks that provided services to
companies in certain high-risk industries, with the justification of
seeking to prevent consumer fraud by stopping fraudsters from
accessing banking services.227 The operation focused on numerous
industries. While some of these industries were inherently illegal,
regulators also targeted legal industries like payday lending and
firearms sales, alleging that those industries carried a high risk for
fraud.228 Payday lending in particular was seen as a prime target.229
Operation Choke Point proved highly controversial, with some critics
219. About Us, DWOLLA, https://www.dwolla.com/about?b=footer [https://perma.cclH83U-
4UJ8] (last visited Sept. 3, 2017).
220. Dwolla, Inc., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0007, ¶¶ 15, 23 (Mar. 2, 2016).
221. Id. ¶ 51 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(b) (2012)).
222. Id. IT 52-62.
223. Id. ¶ 63.
224. Complaint ¶¶ 8-25, CFPB v. Intercept Corp., No. 3:16-cv-00144-ARS (D.N.D. June 6,
2016). The case against Intercept was dismissed for failure to plead sufficient facts to support the
CFPB's claim, though the CFPB may appeal or file a new complaint. See Order Granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 10, No. 3:16-cv-00144-RRE-ARS (D.N.D. Mar. 17, 2017).
225. Complaint, supra note 224, ¶ 2.
226. See id. T 9.
227. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND Gov. REFORM, supra note 70, at 2-3.
228. Id. at 5.
229. Id. at 1; see also Zibel & Kendall, supra note 70.
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arguing that it led banks to simply avoid industries seen by regulators
as high risk, regardless of the legality of the individual company.230
Congress has not created a uniform and preemptive federal
regulatory regime for money transmitters. However, Congress has
acknowledged that greater uniformity of state law governing money
service businesses, including money transmitters, would help combat
money laundering and protect the payment system.231  Congress
specifically recommended that states create and adopt a model law to
address licensing requirements, standards, reporting requirements,
disclosures, and federal BSA compliance, and it further recommended
that states impose a criminal penalty for operating a money
transmitter without the required state license.232
C. Virtual Currency
Virtual currencieS233 share many of the issues of traditional fiat
money transmission while also posing unique regulatory challenges.
Although innovative money transmitters such as PayPal may give rise
to regulatory questions, those transmitters have the advantage of
operating in traditional fiat currency (legal tender issued by a
government). Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin are a "digital
representation of value that function[] as a medium of exchange, a
unit of account, and/or a store of value, but d[o] not have legal tender
status in any jurisdiction."2 34  Although there are over a thousand
230. Michael J. Bresnick, Opinion, How Regulators Can Fight De-Risking, AM. BANKER
(Apr. 7, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinionlhow-regulators-can-fight-de-
risking [https://perma.ccl9DVD-KLJW] ("Unfortunately, as the [Operation Choke Point]
investigations continue, so too have one of the unintended but collateral consequences of such
vigilance: mass de-risking. Members of the industry have raised their hands in frustration and
simply avoided lines of business typically associated with higher risk.").
231. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-325, § 407(a)(1), 108 Stat. 2160, 2246-48 (1994) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5311
(2012)).
232. Id. § 407(b)(1)-(5), 108 Stat. at 2248-49.
233. Although terminology is evolving, this Article differentiates between digital
currencies, which can include digital representations of fiat currencies (e.g., Paypal's use of
"digital" dollars), and virtual currencies that lack legal tender status (e.g., Bitcoin). See DONG HE
ET AL., VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND BEYOND: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 7-8 (2016),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdnl6O3.pdf [https://perma.ccH4EP-ZXTR].
234. Douglas, supra note 86, at 39 (citing In re Coinflip, Inc., CFI'C No. 15-29, at 2 n.2
(Sept. 17, 2015)).
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virtual currencies,235 Bitcoin is by far the most widely used, with a
market capitalization of over $70 billion. 236
Some virtual currencies, including Bitcoin, are decentralized,
which means no central administrator controls the system.237 Instead,
the Bitcoin system is administered by a network of computers running
a common protocol, which creates a record of transactions on a
distributed ledger that is visible to the entire network238 (Bitcoin's
ledger is called the "blockchain").239 This distributed ledger helps
prevent double spending by displaying how each bitcoin is disposed
of.2 4 0  The integrity of the system is maintained by computers
performing public-key cryptography, for which they are rewarded with
bitcoinS241 (of which there is a finite number).242 That process is called
Bitcoin "mining."243 The Bitcoin network is open to any computer that
runs the protocol.244
Other virtual currencies are centralized, which means a central
party "owns" and ultimately administers the system. For example,
Ripple245 uses a proprietary and permissioned system of computers
running a common protocol to record transactions.24 6 A fixed number
of XRP or "ripples" are premined.247 Instead of relying on computers
mining bitcoins to maintain system integrity, Ripple relies on
consensus from trusted computers in the system to validate
235. Coinmarketcap.com lists market capitalizations for 1,140 of what it calls
"crypto-currencies." See COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all
[https://perma.cc/7238-GDCZ] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
236. Id.
237. Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin Financial Regulation:
Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. Scl. & TECH. L. REV. 144,
148 (2014); Douglas, supra note 86, at 39.
238. Brito, Shadab & Castillo, supra note 237, at 149; Douglas, supra note 86, at 39.
239. See Brito, Shadab & Castillo, supra note 237, at 146.
240. JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 6 (2016),
https://www.mercatus.org/systemlfiles/GMUBitcoin_042516_- WEBv2_0.pdf
[https://perma.cclKPT5-SLPE]; Brito, Shadab & Castillo, supra note 237, at 149-50.
241. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 240, at 7-8; Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T.
Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries,
32 YALE J. REG. 495, 505 (2015).
242. The number is limited to 21 million. See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 240, at 7;
Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 241, at 505.
243. See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 240, at 7.
244. Brito, Shadab & Castillo, supra note 237, at 146.
245. See RIPPLE, supra note 165.
246. Coins Compared: Seven Differences Between Ripple and Bitcoin, DIGITAL TECH.





transactions.2 48 Ripples are not designed to be used as money per se,
though some merchants accepted them for a brief period.249 Instead,
the Ripple network is designed to help facilitate transactions that
require the conversion of different stores of value by providing a
common, but not mandatory, medium of exchange.250 It has been used
for currency exchange and intercompany settlements.25 1 XRP- also
serves as a means to defeat attacks on the Ripple protocol. To write to
the ledger, Ripple users must purchase and hold XRP.2 5 2  This
requirement increases the cost of creating false users, a step that
would be necessary to create sufficient consensus to ratify invalid
transactions.2 53
Some virtual currencies, including Bitcoin, can be used as a
medium of direct value transfer because the token (i.e., the bitcoin) is
considered valuable in itself.25 4 Some users accept the token as a cash
equivalent, but others treat it like a foreign currency that must be
exchanged for fiat currency on the Bitcoin market.255
Distributed ledgers associated with virtual currencies facilitate
efficient communication of information across multiple parties to a
transaction and create a relatively permanent and durable record
trail. Financial services industries, including currency exchange and
remittances,256 banking,257 securities,258 and real estate,259 have
248. Id.; see Marcel T. Rosner & Andrew Kang, Note, Understanding and Regulating
Twenty-First Century Payment Systems: The Ripple Case Study, 114 MICH. L. REV. 649, 658-59
(2016).
249. Coins Compared, supra note 246.
250. Id.; see Rosner & Kang, supra note 248, at 660.
251. Penny Crosman, Is Western Union Ready for the Fintech Threat?, AM. BANKER (May
12, 2016, 2:40 PM), http://www.americanbanker.comlnews/bank-technology/is-western-union-
ready-for-the-fintech-threat-1080978-1.html [https://perma.ccl4494-532B].
252. Rosner & Kang, supra note 248, at 660.
253. Id.
254. BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 240, at 6.
255. See Jacob Davidson, No, Big Companies Aren't Really Accepting Bitcoin, TIME:
MONEY (Jan. 9, 2015), http://time.com/money/3658361/dell-microsoft-expedia-bitcoin
[https://perma.cc/92PY-VFP5].
256. See Pete Rizzo, Western Union 'Exploring' Pilot Program with Ripple Labs,
CoiNDESK (Apr. 29, 2015, 10:04 AM), http://www.coindesk.com/western-union-pilot-program-
ripple-labs [https://perma.cc/Y7PY-RXCE].
257. See Yessi Bello Perez, 8 Banking Giants Embracing Bitcoin and Blockchain Tech,
CoINDESK (July 27, 2015, 7:26 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/8-banking-giants-bitcoin-
blockchain [https://perma.ccl8JX2-WPD2].
258. See, e.g., Marion Dankers, Nasdaq Makes First Share Trade Using Blockchain
Technology, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 31, 2015, 11:36 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/markets/12075825/nasdaq-blockchain-share-trade-bitcoin-technology.html
[https://perma.cclX4UT-REGE] ("The Nasdaq stock exchange has used blockchain to transfer
shares for the first time in what the US firm said was 'a seminal moment' in the nascent
technology."); Stan Higgins, 40 Banks Trial Commercial Paper Trading in Latest R3 Blockchain
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expressed interest in using distributed ledgers to facilitate and record
ownership and transfers of assets. In these cases, virtual currencies,
or more specifically the distributed ledgers that record virtual
currency transactions, compete not with dollars but with traditional
databases.260 However, firms are also considering borrowing certain
characteristics from virtual currency-based systems (such as
rendering contracts as functions) without adopting all the attributes,
such as tokens or a universally distributed ledger.261
Some virtual currencies use private closed systems that require
participants to take sole responsibility for the system's security.262
Other virtual currencies use public chains that rely on miners-who
are attracted by the possibility of obtaining valuable tokens-to
protect the integrity of the system.263 Using public systems to record
data involves the transfer of value (albeit a tiny amount) between the
parties, which could potentially trigger money transmission
regulations.
Test, COINDESK (Mar. 3, 2016, 1:08 AM), http://www.coindesk.com/r3-consortium-banks-
blockchain-solutions [https://perma.cc/C74C-PBTU] ("A consortium of financial institutions led
by startup R3CEV has completed a trial of five different blockchain solutions. . .. '[Participants]
modeled a financial asset, commercial paper, a short-term debt instrument."' (alteration in
original)); Nathaniel Popper, Wall Street Clearinghouse to Adopt Bitcoin Technology, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/20l7/01/09/business/dealbook/wall-street-clearing-
house-to-adopt-bitcoin-technology.html?r=0 [https://perma.cc/MK9N-83H8] (describing the
Depository & Trust Clearing Corporation's announcement hat it will use distributed ledger
technology to record credit default swaps).
259. Kim S. Nash, Blockchain: Real Estate Industry Could See Benefits in 2016, WALL ST.
J.: BLOG (Dec. 22, 2015, 4:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/12/22fblockchain-real-estate-
industry-could-see-benefits-in-2016 [https://perma.cclF4ST-4G3C].
260. See Richard Gendal Brown, On Distributed Databases and Distributed Ledgers,
RICHARD GENDAL BROWN (Nov. 8, 2016), https://gendal.me/2016/11/08/on-distributed-databases-
and-distributed-ledgers [https://perma.cc/W2LV-6YTF] (comparing distributed ledgers and
distributed databases in the context of business requirements for storing and sharing data across
multiple parties).
261. See, e.g., RICHARD GENDAL BROWN, JAMES CARLYLE, IAN GRIGG & MIKE HEARN,
CORDA: AN INTRODUCTION 7, 13 (2016), https://www.r3cev.com/s/corda-introductory-whitepaper-
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RA2-DQQT] (laying out characteristics of a distributed
communication system for regulated financial entities that has certain similarities to Bitcoin but
lacks a token, mining, and a universally distributed ledger).
262. SWIFT & ACCENTURE, SWIFT ON DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGIES 11 (2016),
http://www.ameda.org.eg/files/SWIFTDLTs-position-paper-FINAL1804.pdf
[https://perma.cclDLJ9-NRWS].





1. State Regulation of Virtual Currency
Regulation of virtual currency by the states is muddled.
Certain states have found virtual currency to be fully covered by their
existing rules.264 Other states, including Texas and Kansas, have
opined that their state money transmitter laws cover virtual currency
exchanges that convert virtual currencies into "real" currencies.265
However, Texas and Kansas also have found that the mere exchange
of virtual currency for a good or service is more akin to a sale of goods
than to money transmission and, therefore, is not covered by state
money transmission laws.26 6  Other states have amended2 67 their
existing money transmission laws to include virtual currencies.
Legislators in California have advanced a bill to create a virtual
currency-specific regulatory framework, but they have so far been
stymied.268 At the time of this writing, a small minority of states have
provided guidance or rulemaking for virtual currencies, and six states
have virtual currency legislation passed or pending.269  Florida
regulators tried to bring an enforcement action under existing state
264. See, e.g., Bitcoin and Virtual Currency Regulation, WASH. DEP'T FIN. INSTS.,
http://www.dfi.wa.gov/bitcoin [https://perma.ccLPX5-4XU7] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
265. PETER VAN VALKENBURGH & JERRY BRITO, STATE DIGITAL CURRENCY PRINCIPLES
AND FRAMEWORK 2 (2015) (citing Supervisory Memorandum from Charles G. Cooper, Banking
Comm'r, Tex. Dep't of Banking, to All Virtual Currency Companies Operating or Desiring to
Operate in Texas (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.dob.texas.gov/publi/uploads/files/consumer-
information/sml037.pdf [https://perma.cclLF5W-QCAJ], and KAN. OFFICE OF THE STATE BANK
COMM'R, GUIDANCE NO. MT 2014-01, REGULATORY TREATMENT OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES UNDER




266. KAN. OFFICE OF THE STATE BANK COMM'R, GUIDANCE No. MT 2014-01, REGULATORY
TREATMENT OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES UNDER THE KANSAS MONEY TRANSMITTER ACT 3-4 (2014),
http://www.osbckansas.org/mt/guidance/mt201401_virtualcurrency.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EG8-
TD2H]; Supervisory Memorandum from Charles G. Cooper, Banking Comm'r, Tex. Dep't of
Banking, to All Virtual Currency Companies Operating or Desiring to Operate in Texas 3 (2014),
http://www.dob.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/consumer-information/sml037.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q65K-LKZD].
267. Connecticut H.B. 6800 was signed into law on June 19, 2015. It amended
Connecticut's money transmitter law to specifically cover virtual currencies. Jeffrey Alberts &
Meghan Dwyer, Another Sweeping State Virtual Currency Law, LAW360 (July 9, 2015, 10:39
AM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/675801/another-sweeping-state-virtual-currency-law
[https://perma.cc/7TSG-UPNF].
268. Yessi Bello Perez, California's Bitcoin Bill Shelved by State Senator, COINDESK
(Sept. 16, 2015, 12:16 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/californias-bitcoin-bill-shelved-by-state-
senator [https://perma.cc/ZH8N-GGLK].
269. State-By-State Regulatory Tracker for Digital Currency Policy, COIN CTR.,
https://coincenter.org/page/state-digital-currency-regulatory-tracker [https://perma.cc/LM2M-
HWLV] (last updated Aug. 23, 2017).
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laws, only to find that those laws do not cover virtual currencies.270
However, because many state money transmitter laws are broad,
regulators in other states may be more successful at bringing cases
under existing law.2 7 1
New York, through its Department of Financial Services
(NYDFS), is the first state to create a new stand-alone regulatory
framework for virtual currencies.272 The New York BitLicense273
requires a license before a person can engage in "virtual currency
business activity," 274 defined as any conduct involving New York or a
New York resident:
(1) receiving Virtual Currency for Transmission or Transmitting Virtual
Currency, except where the transaction is undertaken for non-financial
purposes and does not involve the transfer of more than a nominal
amount of Virtual Currency;
(2) storing, holding, or maintaining custody or control of Virtual Currency on
behalf of others;
(3) buying and selling Virtual Currency as a customer business;
(4) performing Exchange Services as a customer business; or
(5) controlling, administering, or issuing a Virtual Currency.2 7 5
Importantly, the definition of "virtual currency business
activity" does not include the development and dissemination of
software or the transfer of virtual currency for a nonfinancial purpose,
provided that only a nominal amount of currency is transmitted (such
as using the Blockchain to record securities transactions).2 7 6 Likewise,
the superintendent of the NYDFS allows New York-chartered banks
to engage in virtual currency business activities, and merchants and
consumers who exclusively use virtual currency to buy and sell goods
need not obtain licenses.277  However, to participate in virtual
currency business activities, banks that do not have a New York
charter or approval from the NYDFS need to obtain a BitLicense.278
270. Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5, State v. Espinoza, No. F14-2923
(Fla. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2016) (finding that the sale of Bitcoin did not constitute money
transmission under Florida law).
271. Tu, supra note 173, at 87-88.
272. New York Becomes First State to Finalize Digital Currency Regulatory Framework,
BitLicense, HUNTON & WILLIAMS (June 2015), https://www.hunton.com/images
/content/2/1/v2/2177/ny-lst-digital-currency-regs.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XW4-2MTD].
273. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, §§ 200.1-22 (2017).
274. Id. § 200.3(a).
275. Id. § 200.2(q).
276. See id.
277. Id. § 200.3(c)(1)-(2).
278. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 241, at 540.
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The BitLicense contains many consumer protection provisions
that are similar to those found in traditional money transmitter laws
and regulations. For example, the BitLicense requires applicants to
provide information about and fingerprints of those in control of the
company, as well as information about the company's financial
status.279 The BitLicense specifies minimum capital requirements
based on the nature and scope of the licensee's business,280 requires a
surety bond to be maintained for the benefit of the licensee's
customers,28 1 requires the licensee to maintain books and records that
are available for inspection,282 and mandates that the licensee undergo
examination by the NYDFS at least every two years.283
While much of the BitLicense is similar to traditional state
money transmitter regulation, the BitLicense has certain unique
elements. The most striking is that the BitLicense mandates a
state-specific anti-money-laundering program in addition to that
required by FinCEN.284 New York mandates reporting of certain
transactions not required to be reported to FinCEN.285 Additionally,
compared to FinCEN's risk-based approach, the BitLicense
requirements are far more prescriptive.2 86 Likewise, the BitLicense's
mandatory disclosures are more onerous and prescriptive than those
generally found in traditional money transmission laws.2 8 7  The
BitLicense also requires licensees to maintain a cybersecurity
program288 and to name a chief information security officer.289
The BitLicense has been controversial with virtual currency
companies and supporters. A number of market participants have
complained that the cost of application and compliance exceeds the
value of the New York market.290 Others object to the lack of an
"on-ramp" for smaller businesses to begin operations in New York
without having to either comply with the full slate of regulations or go
279. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.4.
280. Id. § 200.8.
281. Id. § 200.9.
282. Id. § 200.12.
283. Id. § 200.13.
284. Id. § 200.15.
285. See id. § 200.15(e)(2)-(3).
286. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 241, at 542.
287. Id. at 544-45.
288. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, §200.16.
289. Id. § 200.16(c).
290. Daniel Roberts, Behind the "Exodus" of Bitcoin Startups from New York, FORTUNE
(Aug. 14, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/14/bitcoin-startups-leave-new-york-bitlicense
[https://perma.cclL7N9-XLTE].
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through the full application process.291 Still others take issue with the
redundant anti- money-laundering requirements.2 92 Those concerns
have prompted a number of companies to cease doing business in New
York. 2 93 Meanwhile, as of this writing, only three companies-Circle,
Coinbase, and Ripple-have obtained BitLicenses.294
Some efforts have been made to create uniform state laws and
regulations for virtual currencies. The Uniform Law Commission, for
example, formed a drafting committee to create a uniform law to
govern virtual currency businesses.295 The committee produced a bill
that was approved by the Commission in July 2017.296 In September
2015, the CSBS also launched a coordination effort through its Model
Regulatory Framework for Virtual Currency Activities. 297 Although
these efforts seek to harmonize (at least to a degree) the regulation of
virtual currencies at the state level, states seem to be moving in their
own directions, albeit in fits and starts.
2. Federal Regulation of Virtual Currency
The federal government currently regulates virtual currency in
several ways. FinCEN responded relatively early to the rise of virtual
291. Tom Jackson, The Bitcoin Community Reacts to the NY BitLicense, COINTELEGRAPH
(June 4, 2015), https://cointelegraph.cominews/the-bitcoin-community-reacts-to-the-ny-bitlicense
[https://perma.cc/3QFB-K6M5] (reproducing the statement of Perianne Boring, the president of
the Chamber of Digital Commerce, who claimed the "most worrisome aspect [of the BitLicense] is
the lack of a clear on-ramp for digital currency startups").
292. Id. (reproducing also the statement of Peter Van Valkenburgh, the director of
research at Coin Center, who lamented the BitLicense's "unprecedented and discriminatory
state-level anti-money laundering regime").
293. See Roberts, supra note 290.
294. Grace Caffyn, Circle Granted First BitLicense by NYDFS, COINDESK (Sept. 22, 2015,
10:51 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/circle-granted-first-bitlicense-rebrands-as-circle-pay
[https://perma.cc/3J5W-SZU2]; Pete Rizzo, New York Regulators Grant Second BitLicense to
Ripple, COINDESK (June 13, 2016, 6:25 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/new-york-bitlicense-ripple
[https://perma.cc/7SL9-WUA5]; Juan Suarez, Coinbase Obtains the BitLicense, COINBASE BLOG
(Jan. 17, 2017), https:/Iblog.coinbase.com/coinbase-obtains-the-bitlicense-
f1c3e35c4d75#.rOcfxw6ev [https://perma.cclYP4A-BUL8].
295. The drafting committee is called the Committee for the Regulation of Virtual
Currency Businesses Act. Its membership and purpose are described on the Uniform Law
Commission's website. Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act, UNIFORM L. COMM'N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Regulation%20of%2Virtual%20Currency%2
OBusinesses%2OAct [https://perma.cc/L3L9-QF7U] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
296. Press Release, Unif. Law Comm'n, National Law Group Concludes 126th Annual
Meeting (July 19, 2017), http://www.uniformlaws.org/NewsDetail.aspx?title=Uniform%20Law%
20Commission%2OConcludes%20126th%2OAnnual%2OMeeting [https://perma.cc/2X3Z-A89K].
297. CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR




currency with guidance on what constitutes money transmission.298
That guidance addressed the use of "convertible virtual currency,"
which refers to currency that "has an equivalent value in real
currency, or acts as a substitute for real currency."299 FinCEN divided
virtual currency actors into three groups: users, administrators, and
exchangers.300  Users are the people who buy things with the
currency.301 Administrators are in the business of putting virtual
currency into circulation and have the power to redeem or withdraw
currency from circulation.302  Exchangers are in the business of
exchanging virtual currencies for real currency or other virtual
currencies.303 FinCEN advised that administrators and exchangers of
virtual currency are money services businesses and are therefore
subject to the requirements of the BSA, whereas users of virtual
currency are not.3 0 4 FinCEN subsequently clarified that minerS305 and
investors in virtual currencieS306 are not considered money services
businesses.
As discussed previously, Bitcoin does not have an
administrator, but exchanges that facilitate the sale or conversion of
Bitcoin into fiat currency or other stores of value are required to
register with FinCEN.307 In fact, FinCEN fined Ripple in 2015 for
failing to register and maintain an appropriate anti-money-laundering
program.308
298. FIN. CRIMES ENF'T NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDANCE No.
FIN-2013-GO01, APPLICATION OF FINCEN's REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING,
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013).
299. Id. at 1.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 2.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See id. at 2-3.
305. FIN. CRIMES ENF'T NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDANCE No.
FIN-2014-ROO1, APPLICATION OF FiNCEN's REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY MINING
OPERATIONS 2 (2014).
306. FIN. CRIMES ENF'T NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDANCE No.
FIN-2014-R002, APPLICATION OF FINCEN'S REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT AND CERTAIN INVESTMENT ACTIVITY 2 (2014).
307. See Brito, Shadab & Castillo, supra note 237, at 148; Douglas, supra note 86, at 39.
Such companies include Coinbase and Kraken, both of which are registered with FinCEN. See
MSB Registrant Search, FinCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/msb-registrant-search
[https://perma.cclN4NJ-HDEC] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) (enter "Coinbase" into "legal name"
field and click "search," enter "Payward Ventures" into "legal name" field and click "search" for
"Kraken").
308. Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enf't Network, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, FinCEN Fines
Ripple Labs Inc. in First Civil Enforcement Action Against a Virtual Currency Exchanger (May
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Other federal agencies have begun to regulate, or at least take
an interest in, virtual currencies. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
provided tax guidance for virtual currency in 2014.309 For tax
purposes, virtual currency is to be treated as property,310 meaning the
owner must recognize a gain or loss when the virtual currency is
exchanged for a good, a service, or another currency.311 As Professor
Julie Hill points out, this arrangement may lead to some seemingly
absurd results where Bitcoin users are technically obligated to
perform basis calculations for every purchase (no matter how small)
and need to assess which bitcoins they spent to determine
appreciation, because the basis in different bitcoins will vary
depending on what the user paid for them.312 Expressing concerns
regarding the risk of tax noncompliance that virtual currencies may
create, the IRS inspector general has called for the IRS to develop a
more coordinated strategy, to provide more guidance on
documentation requirements, and to update third-party
information-sharing documents to reflect the amounts of virtual
currency held.3 13 The IRS has also sought records from any user of
Coinbase who made a virtual currency transaction between 2013 and
2015.314
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) also has
expressed an interest in Bitcoin. In a settlement order with Coinflip,
a platform "that connects buyers and sellers of standardized Bitcoin
options and futures contracts,"315 the CFTC announced that Bitcoin
constitutes a commodity under the Commodity Exchange Act. 3 1 6
Additionally, the CFTC has brought an enforcement action against a
5, 2015), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-fines-ripple-labs-inc-first-civil-
enforcement-action-against-virtual [https://perma.cc/ANV3-W6C7].
309. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IR-2014-21, IRS VIRTUAL CURRENCY GUIDANCE: VIRTUAL
CURRENCY IS TREATED AS PROPERTY FOR U.S. FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES; GENERAL RULES FOR
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS APPLY (Mar. 25, 2014).
310. Id. at 2.
311. Id.; Julie Andersen Hill, Virtual Currencies & Federal Law, 18 J. CONSUMER & COM.
L. 65, 67 (2014).
312. Hill, supra note 311, at 67.
313. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2016-30-083, AS THE USE OF VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES IN TAXABLE TRANSACTIONS BECOMES MORE COMMON, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE
NEEDED TO ENSURE TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 3 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/
tigta/auditreports/2016reports/201630083fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN9G-82C6].
314. Lalita Clozel, IRS Casts Unusually Wide Net for Bitcoin User Data, AM. BANKER
(Nov. 28, 2016, 1:18 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/irs-casts-unusually-wide-net-
for-bitcoin-user-data [https://perma.ccXKP6-33QT].
315. In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, at 2 (Sept. 17, 2015).
316. Id. at 4; see Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, §§ 1-13, 49 Stat. 1491, 1491-1501
(1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2012)).
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swap execution facility, TeraExchange, for facilitating wash trading
and prearranged trading of contracts based on the value of Bitcoin.317
In 2014, the CFTC held an advisory committee meeting on Bitcoin and
Blockchain derivatives.318
Meanwhile, the SEC established a virtual currencies working
group.319  It also brought enforcement actions involving virtual
currency, including actions against unregistered stock exchanges
using Bitcoin and other virtual currencies to facilitate securities
transactions,3 2 0 and others involving Bitcoin-related Ponzi schemes.321
In mid-2014, the SEC issued an investor alert "to make investors
aware about the potential risks of investments involving Bitcoin and
other forms of virtual currency."322 And in July 2017, the SEC also
announced that virtual currency tokens could constitute a security
under certain circumstances.3 2 3  Finally, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) brought an enforcement action against a company
that sold computers used for Bitcoin mining to consumers but failed to
deliver the computers in a timely manner and used them for the
company's own profit without the purchasers' consent.32 4
Bank regulators have also expressed an interest in Bitcoin.
The OCC has mentioned virtual currencies as a potential source of
risk for banks,3 2 5 as has the Federal Reserve.326 The CFPB has
317. In re TeraExchange LLC, CFTC No. 15-33, at 2 (Sept. 24, 2015).
318. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC's Global Markets
Advisory Committee to Meet October 9, 2014 (Sept. 25, 2014),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr701O-14 [https://perma.cclV78H-QDE4].
319. Jeffrey Jacobi & Marco A. Santori, Say Hello to the SEC's Digital Currency Working
Group, PILLSBURY (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/publications/secs-digital-
currency-working-group [https://perma.cc/4YC6-3JFG].
320. Press Release, SEC, SEC Sanctions Operator of Bitcoin-Related Stock Exchange for
Registration Violations (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543655716 [https://perma.cc/9UJD-E345].
321. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Bitcoin Mining Companies (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-27 1.html [https://perma.cc/X8UJ-ZVSN]; Press
Release, SEC, SEC Charges Texas Man With Running Bitcoin-Denominated Ponzi Scheme (July
23, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539730583
[https://perma.cclXL3U-5YYL].
322. Press Release, SEC, Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related
Investments (May 7, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiealinvestor-alerts-
bulletins/investoralertsia-bitcoin.html [https://perma.cclJAV5-K4ML].
323. Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding DAO Tokens, a
Digital Asset, Were Securities (July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-131.
324. Hill, supra note 311, at 69; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Operators of Bitcoin
Mining Operation Butterfly Labs Agree to Settle FTC Charges They Deceived Consumers (Feb.
18, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/20 16/02/operators-bitcoin-mining-
operation-butterfly-labs-agree-settle [https://perma.cclA434-4TCR].
325. Jerry Brito, The OCC's New Banking Risks Report Mentions "Virtual Currency"
Twice, COIN CTR. (July 13, 2016) (citing OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
warned consumers about the risks posed by Bitcoin,327 especially given
that Bitcoin transactions may not be covered by the Truth in Lending
Act or the Electronic Funds Transfer Act.32 8 Meanwhile, the Federal
Reserve has begun to analyze distributed ledger technology in the
context of payments systems.329
There appears to be a split between federal agencies that view
virtual currencies as a form of property, such as the IRS and the
CFTC, and those that view it as more akin to a traditional currency,
such as FinCEN and the CFPB. FinCEN worries about the illicit use
of virtual currency, just as it does in connection with fiat currency.3 30
The CFPB highlights virtual currency's risk as compared to fiat
currency (e.g., lack of government insurance for balances, volatile
exchange rates, and lack of redress for fraudulent transactions as
compared to credit and debit transactions).3 3 1 It is too early to tell
whether a more coherent and unified federal position will emerge
organically or through congressional action. Given that virtual
currencies are often more of a means than an end in themselves, it
may make sense to keep regulation of the various uses of virtual
currency with the underlying market regulators.
D. Securities Offerings
The sale of corporate securities is an important means by
which companies access the capital they need to grow, thrive, and
create prosperity and opportunity for Americans. Technology has
been a major driver of change in the securities market, and
technology's ability to cheaply and efficiently provide information to




326. Wallace Young, What Community Bankers Should Know About Virtual Currencies,
COMMUNITY BANKING CONNECTIONS (2015), https://www.communitybankingconnections.org/
articles/2015/q2/virtual-currencies [https://perma.cc/CJE2-NPCS].
327. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, RISKS TO CONSUMERS POSED BY VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES (2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb-consumer-advisory-:virtual-
currencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A2Y-WWYS].
328. Hill, supra note 311, at 68-69.
329. David Mills et al., Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments, Clearing, and
Settlement (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Finance and Economics Discussion Series
No. 2016-095, 2016), https://doi.org/10. 17016[FEDS.2016.095 [https://perma.cc/6MSG-MR7S].
330. The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. and Intl Trade and Fin., and the Subcomm. on Econ. Policy, of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 4-6 (2013) (statement of Jennifer
Shasky Calvery, Dir. of the Fin. Crimes Enft Network, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury).
331. Id. at 3-5.
172 [Vol. 20:1:129
THE FINTECH FRONTIER
potential investors nationwide has contributed to a tension between
state and federal regulators.332
This Section focuses on two recent developments that illustrate
that tension. First, the amendments to Regulation A 3 3 3 made
pursuant to the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act 3 34 are
an example of where the federal government has stepped in to address
potentially problematic state regulation. Second, the proposed
changeS335 to Rule 147336 represent a case where the federal
government can support capital formation by ceding jurisdiction to the
states, which are in the best position to regulate.
The regulation of securities in the United States began as a
state project, but as the scope of the economy became more national,
the federal government took on a more dominant and preemptive role.
The rise of technology that facilitates the scaling of securities
transactions is contributing to the increasing pressure placed on
preexisting regulatory assumptions about whether the federal
government or the states should regulate an area exclusively,
concurrently, or at all.
1. State Regulation of Securities Offerings
Regulation of the sale of securities in the United States can be
traced back to 1911, when Kansas passed the first state law
regulating the sale of corporate securities to the public.337 This "blue
sky" law was soon followed by other state laws, and by 1933, Nevada
was the only state without such a law. 3 38 These laws were generally
merit-based-meaning regulators looked both to whether the company
332. See Letter from Jack Herstein, President, N. Am. Sec. Admin'r Ass'n, to A. Nicole
Clowers, Fin. Mkt. & Cmty. Inv. Dir., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office (June 26, 2012) ("Current
Regulation A was adopted before the internet age and .. . it was not designed for nationwide
offerings."), reprinted in U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839, SECURITIES
REGULATION: FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS app. 1 at 23-24
(2012), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-839 [https://perma.cc/8XZE-XZSN].
333. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-63 (2017).
334. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 401-02, 126
Stat. 306, 323-25 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d, 77r (2012)).
335. Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 80 Fed. Reg.
69786 (Nov. 10, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).
336. Rule 147 serves as a "safe harbor" to companies seeking to do an intrastate securities
offering. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(g). Such offerings are exempt from the requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 3(a)(11), 48 Stat. 74, 75-76 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012)).
337. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1:15 (6th
ed. 2009).
338. Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 111-12 (2005).
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selling securities had fully and properly disclosed the terms of the
offer and the company's circumstances and to whether the substantive
terms of the offering were appropriate (in the regulators' opinion) for
the prospective buyers.339 Even after the federal government began to
take a more active role in securities regulation, the states remained
involved in combating fraud and retained responsibility for certain
offerings.
2. Federal Regulation of Securities Offerings
The perception of widespread and brazen fraud340 leading up to
the stock market crash of 1929341 convinced many that state blue sky
laws failed to provide adequate protection,342 and it served as the final
impetus for federal securities regulation.343 Congress subsequently
passed the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) to govern the
original issuance of securities and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) to govern-among other things-reporting
requirements for certain companies, secondary sales of securities, and
exchanges.344 The Exchange Act also created a dedicated federal
regulator for securities-the SEC.3 4 5  The federal laws favored
mandatory disclosure over merit regulation.346 As first passed, the
federal laws were not particularly preemptive of state power, but
instead created a broad realm of concurrent jurisdiction.3 4 7
This situation changed with the passage of the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), 348 which
preempted and displaced state regulation for many securities.349
NSMIA amended the Securities Act to preempt state regulation and
339. HAZEN, supra note 337, § 1:15.
340. Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L.
REv. 977, 983 (2015) (discussing the Ivar Krueger and Musica brothers frauds in the 1920s).
341. Id. at 983-84; see HAZEN, supra note 337, § 1:15.
342. Brummer, supra note 340, at 983-84; see HAZEN, supra note 337 § 1:15.
343. HAZEN, supra note 337, § 1:15. But see PAUL G. MAHONEY, WASTING A CRISIS: WHY
SECURITIES REGULATION FAILS 39 (Chris Rhodes & Jillian Tsui eds., 2015) (disputing the
argument that widespread fraud significantly contributed to the crash).
344. Hal S. Scott, Federalism and Financial Regulation, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION:
STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 139, 148 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds.,
2007).
345. HAZEN, supra note 337, § 1.18.
346. See id.
347. Scott, supra note 344, at 148-49; Jones, supra note 338, at 111.
348. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
349. HAZEN, supra note 337, § 1.24.
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registration requirements for "covered securities,"3 5 0 which were
defined to include those traded on certain exchanges,351 sold to
"qualified purchasers" (the definition of which could be set by the SEC
via rulemaking),352 or sold under an exemption from registration.35 3
NSMIA was passed in response to Congress's view that the dual
regulatory system had become "redundant, costly, and ineffective."35 4
Congress determined that technology, in particular, had changed
capital raising and that changes to the allocation of regulatory
authority between the states and federal government were necessary
to facilitate effective capital formation.355
NSMIA did not completely displace the states. States retained
the ability to require notice filings from companies356 and to enforce
state antifraud laws.3 5 7  States also retained their authority over
noncovered securities, including intrastate offeringS358 and certain
registered securities not traded on national exchanges. Importantly
for smaller businesses, offerings made under Rule 506 of Regulation D
were covered securities that were nonetheless exempt from state law
because they were not considered public offerings.359 By contrast,
Regulation A offerings were not exempt.3 60
Recently, Congress continued its preemption of the states in
the JOBS Act,361 which exempted "crowdfunding" offerings-small
offerings for private companies designed to be conducted over the
Internet-from state regulation,36 2 though the states retained
enforcement authority.363 As discussed below, the JOBS Act also
empowered the SEC to expand the definition of "qualified purchaser"
under Regulation A. 3 64
350. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2012).
351. See id. § 77r(b)(1).
352. See id. § 77r(b)(3).
353. See id. § 77r(b)(4).
354. H.R. REP. No. 104-864, at 39 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
355. See id.
356. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(2).
357. See id. § 77r(c)(1).
358. H.R. REP. No. 104-864, at 40.
359. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 4(a)(2), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (1933)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012)).
360. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO- 12-839, supra note 332, at 2.
361. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 305, 126 Stat.
306, 322 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r, 78o (2012)).
362. See id. § 305(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(2)(F) (2012).
363. Id. § 305(b)-(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(c), 78o.
364. Id. § 305(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D).
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3. Regulation A Offerings
Regulation A is a federal securities regulation aimed at helping
smaller businesses access capital without having to bear the cost of a
full registration.36 5 The regulation allows companies to offer freely
tradable securities to the general public without going through the full
registration process.3 66 The SEC originally promulgated Regulation A
pursuant to its authority under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act,
which allows the SEC to exempt certain offerings if registration is "not
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by
reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the
public offering."367
Although Regulation A exempted companies from full
registration, companies had to submit offering statements to the SEC
for review and respond to the SEC's comments.368 Once the company's
disclosures were sufficient for the SEC, the offering was considered
"qualified" and could be offered to potential investors.369 The firm was
required to provide investors with the qualified disclosure circular.370
Additionally, Regulation A offerings were generally not exempt from
state regulation,371 which meant the issuing company had to comply
with each relevant state's registration process in addition to the
SEC's.
Unlike the SEC, which focused on the adequacy and accuracy
of the company's disclosure,372 the majority of states employed "merit
review."373 Merit review consists of a substantial evaluation of the
merits of the offering to determine whether the offering is "fair."
374
State standards often differ substantively,375 which means issuers (or
their counsel) need to (1) research the specific requirements for each
state in which they plan to offer securities, (2) comply with each
state's requirements, and (3) address comments from each state's
365. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses' Search for "A Moderate
Capital", 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 79-80 (2006); see U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-12-839, supra note 332, at 1-2.
366. Campbell, supra note 365, at 80.
367. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1); see also Campbell, supra note 365, at 99-100.
368. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839 supra note 332, at 11-12.
369. See id. at 10-12.
370. See id.
371. See id. at 2.
372. See id. at 11.
373. Id. at 13.
374. Id. at 8.
375. Id. at 14; see Campbell, supra note 365, at 109-10.
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regulators.376 In some cases, companies warned by counsel of a state's
compliance burdens will simply avoid that state.377
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
most companies opted not to rely on Regulation A at all.3 78 Use of
Regulation A declined from a peak of 116 initial offerings in 1997 to
nineteen in 2011.379 Qualified offerings also declined from fifty-seven
in 1998 to a single offering in 2011.380 Possible reasons for the decline
included the time required to comply with the SEC's requirements,381
the burden of complying with the differing state requirements,38 2 and
an offering limit that was perceived to be too low to justify the costs.3 8 3
These factors came together in the growing preference among
companies seeking capital for Regulation D38 4 (specifically, Rule
506)385 offerings. These offerings were more cost-effective because
state law was largely preempted, the SEC required only notice of the
offering (provided that the offer was made only to accredited
investors), and there was no offering limit. 38 6
The decline in Regulation A offerings prompted Congress to
increase the offering limit from $5 million to $50 million as part of the
JOBS Act. 3 8 7 Early versions of Title IV of the JOBS Act explicitly
preempted state law for Regulation A offerings, but such provisions
were withdrawn after some members of Congress expressed concerns
about the risk of fraud.3 88 Ultimately, Congress amended NSMIA to
376. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839, supra note 332, at 17-18.
377. See id. at 18.
378. See id. at 8-9.
379. Id. at 9.
380. Id.
381. See id. at 16-17.
382. See id. at 17-18; see Campbell, supra note 365, at 106-10; see also Rutheford B.
Campbell, Jr., Regulation A and the JOBS Act: A Failure to Resuscitate, 7 OHIO ST.
ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 317, 322-23 (2012).
383. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839, supra note 332, at 19.
384. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (2017); Campbell, supra note 382, at 321-22; see David
Burton, Offering and Disclosure Reform, in RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 30,
at 277, 278.
385. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
386. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839, supra note 332, at 19; see Campbell,
supra note 382, at 323.
387. Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401(a), 126 Stat. 306, 323 (2012) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2012)); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839, supra note 332,
at 19-20 (identifying the $5 million offering ceiling as a reason for the decline in Regulation A
offerings).
388. See Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646, 651 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing 157 CONG.
REC. H7231 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 2011) (statement of Rep. Gary Peters) ("Regulation A securities can
be high-risk offerings that may also be susceptible to fraud, making protections provided by the
State regulators an essential [feature]."), and H.R. REP. NO. 112-206, 13 (2011) (minority view)
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permit preemption if the Regulation A securities were sold to a
qualified purchaser38 9 as defined by the SEC.39 0  Congress also
directed the GAO to assess the impact of state regulation on
Regulation A offerings.391 The GAO study identified the burden of
complying with state regulations as a possible deterrent to issuers
using Regulation A. 392
Reacting to the ease with which small businesses reach
potential investors nationwide through the Internet, the states have
acknowledged the need for greater uniformity in their registration.3 9 3
However, they also argue that the state regulatory process is
important for consumer protection and that consumers have suffered
as a result of preemption for Rule 506 offerings.394 The states further
argue that assessing the effects of state regulation and extending
preemption are premature, given the changes to Regulation A and
technological changes. Moreover, creating a more coordinated review
system would remove the need for preemption.395
In response to the JOBS Act, the SEC proposed amendments to
Regulation A 3 9 6 in January 2014.397 So-called Regulation A+ created
two tiers of offerings. Tier 1 offerings were limited to $5 million 398
(later increased to $20 million in the final rule)399 and remained
subject to concurrent state regulation. Tier 2 offerings were limited to
$50 million; 400 were subject to continuing mandatory disclosure,
including annual reports;401 and were effectively exempt from state
registration because all purchasers of Tier 2 offerings were deemed to
be qualified purchasers.402 To use either tier of offering, a company
("Regulation A securities are sometimes high-risk offerings that may be susceptible to fraud,
making the protections provided by state review essential.")).
389. JOBS Act § 401(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2012) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)
(1996)).
390. National Securities Markets Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 102(b)(3), 110
Stat. 3416, 3418 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012)).
391. JOBS Act § 402.
392. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABIIDTY OFF., GAO-12-839, supra note 332, at 20.
393. Letter from Jack Herstein to A. Nicole Clowers, supra note 332, at 23.
394. See id. at 24.
395. See id. at 23.
396. See Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 3926 (proposed Jan. 23, 2014) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230) [hereinafter Proposed Rule Amendments].
397. See id. at 3925.
398. Id. at 4000.
399. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2017).
400. Proposed Rule Amendments, supra note 396, at 4000.
401. Id. at 4004.
402. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2012).
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needed to submit an offering statement to the SEC containing a
significant amount of information about the company and its
offering.403
Unsurprisingly, this preemption of the states was highly
controversial. Numerous state regulators,404 consumer advocates,405
members of Congress,406 and at least one company407 wrote to oppose
Tier 2 preemption on the grounds that it would harm investors and
represent an inappropriate power grab by the SEC. The states also
pointed to the development of a coordinated review process for existing
Regulation A offerings they believed would mitigate the costs of state
regulation.408  However, the majority of commenters,409 including
businesses,410 business advocates,411 members of Congress,412 think
403. Proposed Rule Amendments, supra note 396, at 4000; see also id. at 4008-41
(providing a template for Form 1-A).
404. See, e.g., Letter from William M. Beatty, Sec. Adm'r, Wash. Dep't of Fin. Insts., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Mar. 24, 2014) (on file with author); Letter from Irving L.
Faught, Adm'r, Okla. Dep't of Sec., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Mar. 24, 2014) (on file
with author); Letter from William F. Galvin, Sec'y, Commonwealth of Mass., to SEC Comm'rs
(Mar. 24, 2014) (on file with author); Letter from Andrew M. Hartnett, Mo. Comm'r of Sec., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Mar. 24, 2014) (on file with author); Letter from Chad
Johnson, Bureau Chief, Iny'r Prot. Bureau, N.Y. State Attorney Gen.'s Office, to Mary Jo White,
Chair, SEC (May 7, 2014) (on file with author); Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, N. Am. Sec.
Adm'rs Assoc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Mar. 24, 2014) (on file with author).
405. See Letter from Barbara Roper, Dir. of Inv'r Prot., Consumer Fed'n of Am., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Feb. 11, 2015) (on file with author).
406. See Letter from Edward Markey et al., Members of Cong., to Mary Jo White, Chair,
SEC (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-123.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZXV8-JFRS].
407. See Letter from Nick Bhargava, Exec. Vice President, Groundfloor Fin. Inc., to Mary
Jo White, Chair, SEC (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-139.pdf
[https://perma.cc[LZX4-5ZD6].
408. See Letter from William Beatty, President and Wash. Sec. Dir., N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs
Ass'n, to Brent J. Fields, Sec'y, SEC (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-
13/s71113-144.pdf [https://perma.c/2657-KGVK].
409. See Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
410. See Letter from William Klehm, Chairman and CEO, Fallbrook Techs., Inc., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Mar. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-
13/s71113-54.pdf [https://perma.cclPR86-Y9SE]; Letter from John Rodenrys, Exec. Dir. R&D,
Leading BioSciences, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Mar. 24, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-58.pdf [https://perma.cclW53M-BGA9].
411. See Letter from Kim Wales, Exec. Bd. Member, CrowdFund Intermediary
Regulatory Advocates, to Kevin M. O'Neill, Deputy Sec'y, SEC (May 14, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-109.pdf [https://perma.cc/B56G-RDAG].
412. See Letter from Patrick McHenry et al., Members of Cong., to Mary Jo White, Chair,
SEC (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7- 11-13/s71113-129.pdf
[https://perma.ccP2MX-LDF8].
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tanks,413 and academics,414 argued in favor of preemption as necessary
to make Regulation A cost-effective.
The preemption provision remained in the final rule,415
prompting a lawsuit by the state securities regulators of Montana and
Massachusetts.416 The state regulators challenged the legality of the
SEC's designation of all Tier 2 purchasers as "qualified purchasers,"417
in part because the SEC did not adequately consider investor
protection in making the designation.418 The court rejected those
arguments.419
The new Regulation A went into effect on June 19, 2015.420
Online securities platformS421 that facilitate corporate offerings and
individual companies have used Regulation A+ to offer securities
directly to the public.422 As of October 31, 2016, 147 new Regulation
A+ offerings had been filed with the SEC.4 2 3 Of these, eighty-one had
been reviewed by the SEC and found to have sufficiently complete
disclosures to be offered for sale.4 2 4 Although total offerings were
fairly evenly split between Tier 1 and Tier 2 (49 percent to 52 percent,
respectively), 61 percent of qualified offerings were Tier 2.425 Tier 2
413. See Letter from Daniel Gorfine & Staci Warden, Dirs. of Ctr. for Fin. Mkts., Milken
Inst., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-
13/s71113-45.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS7D-BLDS].
414. See Campbell, supra note 382, at 329-32; Letter from Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr.,
Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law, Univ. of Ky., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC 2 (Mar. 5,
2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-36.pdf [https://perma.ccASS7-YAG8]
(arguing that the SEC did not go far enough).
415. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2017).
416. See Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
417. See id. at 653.
418. See id. at 654.
419. See id. at 656.
420. SEC Final Rules, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/rules/
finallfinalarchive/finalarchive20l5.shtml [https://perma.cc/2NTW-6A52] (last visited Sept. 30,
2017).
421. See, for example, new firms such as SEEDINVEST, https://www.seedinvest.com
[https://perma.cc/KD44-45ES] (last visited Sept. 30, 2017), and STARTENGINE,
https://www.startengine.com [https://perma.cc/Q3L3-AUCG] (last visited Sept. 30, 2017), as well
as traditional broker-dealers such as A+ Offerings: JOBS Act Changes to Regulation A, WR
HAMBRECHT & Co., https://wrhambrecht.com/regulation-a-ipo-offering [https://perma.cclBP3W-
2VCU] (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).
422. See, for example, THRILLCORP, http://www.thrillcorp.com [https://perma.cc/FHD5-
ZCEH] (last visited Aug. 2, 2016), a builder of theme parks that offers securities (at the time of
this writing) directly on its website.




425. See id. at 7 tbl.1.
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offerings are on average larger426 and solicit investment from more
states.427 A greater percentage of Tier 2 offerings are made for the
maximum amount allowed, as compared to Tier 1 offerings, though
the majority of offerings in both tiers are made for less than the cap.4 28
The use of intermediaries (for example, a broker-dealer) is
"significantly higher" for Tier 2 offerings, consistent with nationwide
solicitation and higher investor search costs.4 29
The relative use of Tier 1 versus Tier 2 offerings indicates that
firms seeking to cast a wider net for investors value preemption.
Although the different limits for the tiers also likely play a role in
selection, the fact that a significant number of firms use Tier 2 for
offerings at or under $20 million-but solicit in many more states than
firms using Tier 1 offerings-indicates that preemption becomes more
valuable as the number of states increases, even if Tier 1 is an option.
4. Rule 147 Offerings
While Regulation A represents a case of technology helping to
move the transactions to a national level, Rule 147 presents the
opposite problem-transactions that are truly intrastate in nature but
that may technically qualify as interstate because of the limits (or lack
thereof) of technology. This dynamic leads to the risk that the federal
government will needlessly regulate in an environment where the
states are better suited-practically and politically.
Rule 147 is a safe harbor provision for offerings that are
exempt from registration under Section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act
for intrastate securities offerings.430 That section originally exempted
securities offered only to residents of the state in which the issuer is
incorporated and does business.431 Rule 147 provides a set of criteria
that insulate a compliant issuer from the risk that its Section 3(a)(11)
426. Among all offerings, Tier 1 offerings average $10 million requested compared to $26
million for Tier 2; for qualified offerings, the average sought for Tier 1 offerings is $7 million
compared to $26 million for Tier 2. See id. The median offering amount for Tier 1 offerings is $6
million ($5 million for qualified offerings), compared to $20 million for Tier 2 offerings (both
general and qualified). See id.
427. The median number of states in which a firm using Tier 1 would solicit investors is
four (eight among qualified offerings), compared to a median of fifty states for Tier 2 offerings
(both general and qualified). Id. at 8-9.
428. Among all Tier 1 offerings, 26 percent are made at the tier limit, though this figure
declines to 6 percent for qualified offerings. Id. at 7 tbl.1. For all Tier 2 offerings, meanwhile, 32
percent are made at the tier limit, with a slight increase to 33 percent for qualified offerings. Id.
429. Id. at 25.
430. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2017).
431. Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 81 Fed. Reg.
83494, 83498-99 (Nov. 21, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200).
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offering would be deemed an unregistered sale of securities subject to
potential sanction.432
Recently, numerous states have adopted or expanded
intrastate "crowdfunding" laws to make it easier for companies to
raise money from their local communities.433 Compliance with Rule
147 was traditionally a prerequisite under state securities law for
local offerings.434 However, the requirements of Rule 147 may have
presented an impediment to companies using the new intrastate
crowdfunding laws. For example, the SEC's Advisory Committee on
Small and Emerging Companies identified several potential problems,
including the concern that using the Internet to advertise an offering
would be impermissible under Rule 147 because people outside of the
state could see the offering.435
In response to these concerns, the SEC proposed changes to
Rule 147,436 including allowing issuers to engage in general
solicitation.4 3 7  Under the proposal, issuers may use the web to
advertise their offerings-provided that they comply with other
requirements, including notifying potential purchasers that the offet
is only for residents of a single state.438 The proposed rule also would
simplify the test for an issuer to show that its principal place of
business is within the state in which it is making its offering.439 These
requirements would effectively ensure that the issuer has an exclusive
relationship to the state of the offering.440
Importantly, the SEC proposed the changes to Rule 147 using
its general authority under Section 28 of the Securities Act, as
opposed to Section 3(a)(11).441 Doing so enabled the SEC to introduce
432. Id. at 83494-95.
433. Letter from Judith M. Shaw, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, to Brent J. Fields,
Sec'y, SEC 2 (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-15/s72215-22.pdf
[https://perma.cclUU3N-SNZK].
434. Id.
435. See Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 80 Fed.
Reg. 69786, 69788-89 (proposed Nov. 10, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230) [hereinafter
Exemptions to Facilitate Offerings]; Letter from Stephen M. Graham & M. Christine Jacobs,
Co-Chairs, Advisory Comm. on Small and Emerging Cos., to Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC (Sept.
23, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-recommendation-modernize-rule- 147.pdf
[https://perma.cc/533K-35FA].
436. See Exemptions to Facilitate Offerings, supra note 435, at 69786.
437. See id. at 69788.
438. Id. at 69828.
439. Id. at 69830.
440. Letter from author & Staci Warden, Milken Inst. Ctr. for Fin. Mkts., to Brent J.
Fields, Sec'y, SEC 6 (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22- 15/s72215-26.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TJ6W-NB22].
441. See Exemptions to Facilitate Offerings, supra note 435, at 69789.
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substantive requirements on the nature of the offering. Those
requirements included a $5 million annual limit on offerings made
under Rule 147.442 The proposal also required that the relevant state
place limits on the amount certain investors could purchase.443 The
SEC acknowledged that moving Rule 147 away from Section 3(a)(11)
to Section 28 meant the rule would no longer function as a safe harbor
for offerings made under Section 3(a)(11), but the SEC stated that the
Section 3(a)(11) exemption would remain an option for issuers.444
The SEC's proposal was met with skepticism from commenters,
including legal practitioners,445 industry advocates,446 think tanks,447
and state securities regulators.448 Commenters noted that moving
Rule 147 from Section 3(a)(11) would jeopardize state securities laws
that require Rule 147 compliance.449 Commenters also pointed out
that imposing substantive federal requirements would prevent the
states from creating the securities offerings that best suited their
residents' needs.450 A comment letter this Author coauthored with
Staci Warden argued that even though use of the Internet-which
inevitably connects issuers with residents of other states-likely gives
the federal government jurisdiction as a constitutional matter, the
federal government should nevertheless refrain from imposing
substantive regulation.451 Offerings made under Rule 147 are true
intrastate offerings. Commenters argued that when all the parties to
a transaction are in one state, they can influence the state's policy.
Thus, the state is likely to be, on average, more nimble and
442. Id. at 69788-89.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 69789.
445. See Letter from Sara Hanks, CEO, CrowdCheck, Inc., to Brent J. Fields, Assistant
Sec'y, SEC 2 (Jan. 2, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-15/s72215-9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2Z6V-JLF8]; Letter from David Lynn, Chair of Fed. Regulation of Sec. Comm.,
Am. Bar Assoc., to Brent J. Fields, Sec'y, SEC (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
22-15/s72215-29.pdf [https://perma.cclH5UP-29471.
446. See Letter from Kim Wales, Exec. Bd. Member, CrowdFund Intermediary
Regulatory Advocates, to Brent J. Fields, Assistant Sec'y, SEC (Jan. 10, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-15/s72215-17.pdf [https://perma.cclV64F-ABEP].
447. See Letter from author & Staci Warden to Brent J. Fields, supra note 440, at 2.
448. See Letter from Judith M. Shaw to Brent J. Fields, supra note 433, at 2-9.
449. See id.; see also Letter from Sara Hanks to Brent J. Fields, supra note 445, at 1;
Letter from author & Staci Warden to Brent J. Fields, supra note 440, at 4.
450. See Letter from Sara Hanks to Brent J. Fields, supra note 445, at 2; Letter from
author & Staci Warden to Brent J. Fields, supra note 440, at 6-7; Letter from Judith M. Shaw to
Brent J. Fields, supra note 433, at 3-4.
451. Letter from author & Staci Warden to Brent J. Fields, supra note 440, at 6-7.
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responsive, rendering it the appropriate actor to regulate the
offerings.452
On October 26, 2016, the SEC finally amended Rule 147.453
The SEC also created a new Rule 147A for offerings made by
companies that are incorporated under the laws of a state different
from their primary place of business and that use general solicitation
to offer their securities.454 Rule 147A sales are limited to residents of
the state that is the company's primary place of business.455 The SEC
concurred with commenters that it was "appropriate that the resident
investor protections in intrastate offerings primarily flow from the
requirements of state securities law."4 5 6 The SEC declined to move
forward with the federally imposed limits on offering and investment
size.4 5 7 It noted that most states already limit relevant offerings to
less than $5 million per year and limit how much individuals can
invest.458  In light of the policy motivating Section 3(a)(11)-to
facilitate companies financing themselves from local investorS459-and
the fact that states were engaged in providing consumer protection,
the SEC deferred to the states on whether such limits are
appropriate.460 Under the new rules, Rule 147 and 147A offerings are
subject to the antifraud and civil liability provisions of federal
securities law.4 6 1
IV. WHO SHOULD REGULATE?
Under the current expansive reading of the Interstate
Commerce Clause462-which grants Congress the ability to regulate
the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, persons or
things in interstate commerce, and anything that has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce463-Congress can regulate and displace
state regulation of fintech. But just because Congress can regulate
452. Id.
453. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Final Rules to Facilitate Intrastate and
Regional Securities Offerings (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-
226.html [https://perma.cc/5ZQS-H8YY].
454. Id.
455. Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 81 Fed. Reg.
83494, 83500 (Nov. 21, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200).
456. Id. at 83509.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 83495.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 83509.
462. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
463. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005).
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does not necessarily mean it should. Instead, Congress should have a
compelling reason to intervene. The circumstances described herein
highlight three such reasons that could justify intervention: efficiency,
competitive equity among market participants, and political equity
among the residents of the various states. However, the case of Rule
147 presents a counterexample: although Congress and, by extension,
the SEC have the authority to regulate, they should refrain from doing
so.
A. Efficiency
Commentators who likely disagree significantly on what the
substance of the law should be nevertheless recognize the value of
efficiency provided by consistent national rules.4 64 Whether efficiency
is best served by federalism or federalization is a case-by-case
question. For example, Professor Barry Weingast describes
"market-preserving federalism," in which a federalist structure
encourages competition among governments in the regulation of
markets and thus discourages rent-seeking and contributes to greater
prosperity.465 If a market met those criteria, federalization would be
unnecessary, if not harmful.
Unfortunately, the regulation of nonbank lenders, money
transmitters, and pre-reform Regulation A offerings should not qualify
as market-preserving federalism. The missing element is what
Weingast calls a "common market" that would prevent states from
creating trade barriers to the products of other states.466 Instead, the
states are able to impose state-specific conditions on market entry,
including licensing requirements and limits on product offerings and
service offerings.467 Consumers and market participants suffer under
464. Compare Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 32, at 83 ('The erosion of state power in
itself need not be problematic from a consumer protection perspective. In an era of interstate
banking, uniform regulation of consumer credit products at the federal level may well be more
efficient than a litany of consumer protection rules that vary from state to state. The problem is
not in the federal preemption; it is in the failure of federal law to offer a suitable alternative to the
preempted state law." (emphasis added)), with Joseph R. Mason, Robert Kulick & Hal J. Singer,
The Economic Impact of Eliminating Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 12 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 781, 787-88 (2010) (citing Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 32, at 83) ("A deeper
examination of the economics of preemption reveals that Professor Warren had it right in her
law review article: preemption has been a force for increasing the efficiency of the banking
sector.").
465. Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving
Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 5-6 (1995).
466. Id. at 4.
467. See, e.g., supra Parts III.A.1, III.B, and III.B.2.
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redundant and contradictory regulation rather than reaping the
benefits of market-preserving federalism.
Having to research and comply with multiple regulations or
having to pay for multiple licenses is inefficient, time consuming, and
costly for companies, especially new firms with limited resources.
This lack of competition imposes a direct cost on consumers and
benefits incumbents who are able to capture the surplus that would
otherwise be competed away. An example from lending is the credit
card market in the 1980s, which was primarily intrastate at the
beginning and shifted to interstate competition over time.468
Christopher Knittel and Victor Stango show that state usury limits
served as a "focal point for tacit collusion" among banks that clustered
their rates at the upper limit of what they could charge under state
law.4 69  Over time, as the credit card market became subject to
interstate competitive pressures in the wake of the Marquette
decision, DIDA, and other reforms, the ability for in-state firms to
collude declined, resulting in decreased costs to consumers.470 Similar
tacit collusion may also exist in payday loans, an industry subject
primarily to state-by-state regulation.471
State-by-state regulation also contributes to regulatory
uncertainty. As Professor Kevin Tu points out in the context of money
transmission, the state-by-state regulatory picture dramatically
increases "search costs" for firms, as those firms constantly need to
assess just what the law is.472 That burden is likely to fall hardest on
younger and smaller firms that lack industry experience and the
resources to hire large legal teams.473 These are the very firms most
likely to introduce new, innovative products.474
The search cost problem is compounded by the fact that it is
not a one-time expense. Even if states all agree to a uniform law and
468. Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit
Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1703, 1707-08 (2003).
469. See id. at 1719.
470. Id. at 1721-22.
471. Robert DeYoung & Ronnie J. Phillips, Payday Loan Pricing 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, Research Working Paper No. 09-07, 2009), https://www.kansascityfed.org/
publicat/reswkpap/pdf/rwp09-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5ED-QY56].
472. Tu, supra note 173, at 112.
473. Id. at 112-13.
474. See, e.g., William J. Baumol, Education for Innovation: Entrepreneurial
Breakthroughs Versus Corporate Incremental Improvements (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10578, 2004), in 5 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 33, 54 (Adam B.
Jaffe et al. eds., 2005), http://www.nber.org/chapters/cl0806.pdf [https://perma.ccY7UM-5GH6]
(finding that startups and entrepreneurs are more likely to create breakthrough innovations and




the law remains uniform as enacted, there is always the risk that
some states will change their laws or their statutory and regulatory
interpretations.4 7 5  Preemption limits the scope of necessary
monitoring and provides greater stability and certainty.
Pre-reform Regulation A illustrates the way redundant and
contradictory regulation can interfere with the functioning of a
national market. The inability of firms to use Regulation A because of
the costs of working with multiple regulators harmed businesses and
their would-be employees and customers, and it reduced economic
growth. Providing a consistent legal environment can facilitate
greater access and opportunity, as shown by the increase in usage of
Regulation A, which went from one qualified offering in 2011 to
eighty-one as of October 2016, the majority of which used the
preemptive features of Tier 2.
The inconsistent treatment of nonbank loans by the courts
provides another example. With regard to interest rates and the
definition of what constitutes interest, it is clear that state law will
control.476 What is unclear, however, is which state's law should
control and what role the federal government should play in ensuring
respect for the proper state's law. Opponents of bank partnerships
view an agreement made over the Internet between a lender in State
A and a borrower in State B as an example of the lender coming to the
borrower, which means State B's law should control. However, one
could as easily argue that State A's laws should control because the
borrower came to the lender to take advantage of the products
available under the lender's state laws. In the latter case, an effort by
State B to reach into State A to prevent State B's residents from
conducting a transaction in State A would likely be viewed as an
unconstitutionally extraterritorial statute.477
This tension was noted in Marquette in the context of
determining the location of the bank. The court found that the
475. This drift away from uniformity has been seen in other contexts, including the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). See generally John C. Minahan, Jr., The Eroding Uniformity
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 KY. L.J. 799 (1976) (discussing how factors including
amendments, subsequent state laws, and judicial decisions had reduced the degree of similarity
between all states that nominally enacted the UCC).
476. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing how federal law looks to underlying state law for
regulation of interest rates).
477. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989) ("[Sjtate law that has the 'practical
effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State's borders is invalid under the
Commerce Clause."); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) ('The Commerce Clause
also precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of
the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State."); Cotto Waxo Co.
v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[A] statute has extraterritorial reach when it
necessarily requires out-of-state commerce to be conducted according to in-state terms.").
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location of the lender should be controlling, in part because the
lender's state bore the deepest and most consistent relationship to
every transaction.478 The NBA's solution to this quandary is akin to a
choice-of-law provision that resolves the question in favor of the state
law that the lender and borrower agreed to.4 7 9 The NBA thus
facilitates interstate contracts.480 Contrast this experience with the
experience of marketplace lenders post-Madden, where uncertainty
about the legality of loans has crippled access to lending for certain
borrowers.48 '
State-by-state regulation may also impede the securitization
markets. As Mason, Kulick, and Singer point out, inconsistency in
allowable interest rates, finance charges, and terms can hamper
securitization of loans.4 8 2 Securitization can be an important source of
funds for loans,483 especially for small businesses. However,
inconsistencies in loan terms (often driven by regulatory
requirements) have kept the loan securitization markets for small
businesses relatively underdeveloped.48 4
Finally, the lack of consistent regulation may require more
complex financial engineering to make products compliant. The
change in structure of loans by marketplace lenders provides an
example. Banks are restructuring their products to retain an interest
for the purposes of regulatory protection rather than economic
efficiency.485 This change is not driven by competitive pressure or
customer-oriented innovation, but rather to avoid regulatory
uncertainty. The result is greater complexity and higher costs, with
the additional cost being passed on to borrowers and investors.
B. Competitive Equity
There is much wisdom to Senator Dale Bumpers's (D-AR)
reaffirmation of the principle that "institutions offering similar
478. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
310-11 (1978).
479. Smith, supra note 51, at 1672.
480. Id.
481. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 72, at 25.
482. Mason, Kulick & Singer, supra note 464, at 797-98.
483. Id. at 798.
484. DAVID BROWN & EMILY LINER, To GROW NEW BUSINESSES, IMPROVE ACCESS TO
CREDIT 18-19 (2016), http://s3.amazonaws.com/content.thirdway.org/publishing/documents/pdfs/
000/002/037/to-grow-new-businesses-improve-access-to-credit.pdf?147432 1861 [https://perma.cc/
4ABB-VZYL].
485. Smith, supra note 51, at 1677-80.
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products should be subject to similar rules."4 8 6 In the realm of fintech,
that is often not the case. Instead, competing institutions offering
similar products on a nationwide basis are often subject to different
regulations, depending on whether they are a bank.4 8 7
Marketplace lending presents an obvious, but not exclusive,
example. Marketplace lenders offering bank-like loan products
compete with banks. Although they are governed by many of the
same consumer protection laws as banks, marketplace lenders lack
banks' interest export capability.488  Banks are able to offer a
consistent product nationwide, but marketplace lenders are subject to
state-by-state rules.48 9 Some lenders have sought to minimize this
competitive disadvantage by partnering with banks, but those
partnerships are under legal threat.
Policymakers should ask if it should matter whether a loan is
made by a bank or a nonbank lender. Perhaps, instead, the
characteristics of the loan and the facts surrounding the negotiation
and agreement to its entry should be determinative. The plaintiffs
argument in Bethune is striking in how much it relies on
technicalities.490 The plaintiff does not allege that Lending Club
misled him as to the terms of the loan, hid fees, or coerced him.
Indeed, he appears to have gotten exactly the type of loan he expected.
Despite the lack of fraud or coercion, the plaintiff alleges that because
Lending Club was the true lender, and the bank only a sham lender,
the loan was illegal under New York law.4 9 1
Although the Bethune plaintiff points to the more regulated
status of banks as a justification for their exemption from usury laws,
he does not explain which regulations serve to justify the exemption
486. 126 CONG. REC. 6907 (1980) (statement of Sen. Bumper).
487. See, e.g., supra Parts III.A.3 (discussing differences in ability to export laws
governing interest between banks and nonbank lenders), III.B.1 (discussing general exemption
from money transmission licensing requirements for banks).
488. See supra Part III.A.3.
489. See, e.g., Telis Demos, Venture Capitalists Get Radical and Invest in a. . . Bank,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2016, 8:53 AM), http://www.wsj.comlarticles/the-new-banking-approach-for-
silicon-valley-is-a-bank-1478004624 [https://perma.ce/32MZ-GPAQ] ("Cross River uses its
position as a chartered and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.-member bank to do things that are
tougher for nonbank firms under U.S. rules. That includes originating loans in any state and
moving funds over the banking system's rails on behalf of its partners or customers."); see also
Wack, supra note 2 ("Banks that are getting into the online lending business have one additional
edge over the startups-greater egulatory certainty. Firms like Lending Club and Prosper issue
their loans through partner banks in a somewhat byzantine effort, which has attracted judicial
scrutiny, to get around state-by-state interest rate caps.").
490. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
491. Bethune v. LendingClub Corp., No. 16 CIV. 2578 (NRB), 2017 WL 462287, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2017).
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that do not apply to marketplace lenders.492 Marketplace lenders are
subject to consumer protection laws-including the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act,4 93 the Fair Housing Act,49 4 the Truth in Lending
Act,4 9 5 Dodd-Frank's prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts
or practices,496 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act49 7-that are similar
to those governing banks.498 Additionally, marketplace lenders that
work with banks are "regulated" by their bank partners.499 Further,
under the Bank Service Company Act, these lenders may fall under
the direct regulation of the federal regulator of their partner banks for
the services they perform for those banks (including loan servicing
and lead generation).5 0 0  As such, it is unclear what regulatory
discrepancy justifies prohibiting a marketplace lender from making a
loan that a bank can make. This question is important for borrowers.
Rules that place certain providers at a competitive disadvantage-by
depriving them of the regulatory consistency enjoyed by banks-limit
competition and innovation. As seen in the history of interest rate
regulation, this limitation can favor incumbents at the expense of
492. Id.
493. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 501-03, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521
(1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-91f (2012)).
494. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-19, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (1968) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2012)).
495. Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§ 101-45, 82 Stat. 146, 146-59
(1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67f (2012)).
496. Consumer Financial Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031, 124 Stat. 1376,
2005-06 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012)). The CFPB also collects
consumer complaints about marketplace lenders. See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, CFPB Now Accepting Complaints on Consumer Loans from Online Marketplace Lender
(Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-now-accepting-
complaints-on-consumer-loans-from-online-marketplace-lender [https://perma.cc/3QZA-JS5M].
497. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Note, however, that the exact scope of the rules may
differ somewhat.
498. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 72, at 10.
499. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. No. 2013-29, RISK
MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE (2013), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2013/bulletin-
2013-29.html [https://perma.cclHF4H-B96S]; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIL-44-2008, GUIDANCE
FOR MANAGING THIRD-PARTY RISK (2008), https://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/financial/2008/fil08044.htm1 [https://perma.cc/H856-PWUA]. See also FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., FIL-50-2016, FDIC SEEKING COMMENT ON PROPOSED GUIDANCE FOR THIRD-PARTY
LENDING (2016), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2016/fill6050.html
[https://perma.ccX4HL-38VF].
500. See Bank Service Company Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2613, 110 Stat. 3009,
3485-87 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1867(c) (2012)); Sawyer v. Bill Me Later,
Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1368 (D. Utah 2014).
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higher-than-necessary prices and unnecessarily limited access for
consumers.50'
Regulation should follow the risk created, and similar products
should be regulated similarly. Although it is true that banks have
regulatory requirements not shared by marketplace lenders, such as
obligations under the Community Reinvestment Act and
safety-and-soundness inspection to protect the federal deposit
insurance fund, those requirements are tied to aspects of banks'
business-such as deposit taking-that marketplace lenders do not
share.502  Hence, differential regulation may be justified. To the
extent that marketplace lenders present the same risks as banks,
however, they should be regulated similarly; on the other hand,
regulation should be adjusted according to the extent to which models
present different or lesser risks. Regulating marketplace lenders
similarly to banks would equalize the rulebook for market participants
and encourage competition from new players, which would ultimately
benefit consumers.
C. Political Equity Between Citizens of the Several States
It is a well-worn saying from Justice Brandeis that "a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments."503 Professors Samuel
Issacharoff and Catherine Sharkey wryly note: "While Justice
Brandeis's aphorism ... is oft repeated, the tail end of his claim tends
to get lost."5 0 4 In full, his saying reads: "[A] single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."505
There is always the risk that the state as laboratory will have an
accident or that it will create a policy that benefits itself but sends
pollutants downstream506 (often called a "spillover").50 7 This risk is
501. See supra notes 33, 34, 42, 468, 469, and 471, and accompanying text.
502. See Letter from John W. Ryan, President and CEO, Conference of State Bank
Supervisors, to Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller (Apr. 13,
2017), https://www.csbs.org/regulatory/resources/Documents/Attached%20Exhibits%20-
%200CC%2OComplaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ2C-E44D] (listing areas of federal banking law
that only apply to FDIC-insured deposit-taking banks).
503. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
504. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 13, at 1355.
505. New State, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
506. A clear example is product liability regulation, where, as Issacharoff and Sharkey
note: "Products liability law raises the specter of spillover effects, whereby a state uses its
liability regime to benefit in-state residents with larger compensation payments, or exports the
costs of its regulation to out-of-state manufacturers and product consumers in the rest of the
nation." Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 13, at 1386.
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particularly acute in national markets that are regulated on a
state-by-state basis.5 0 8 Many innovative fintech markets, including
lending and money transmission, fall into the category of national
markets regulated state by state.
Although the courts and many scholars view the need to
prevent or at least minimize encroachments by one state's citizens on
another's to be a core component of American federalism,509 others
have a more sanguine view of spillovers. Professors Heather K.
Gerken and Ari Holtzblatt, for example, argue that in some
cases-especially those where an issue has high political salience
among the public-benefits to spillovers also exist, including
increasing political engagement and forcing reform.51 0 To Gerken and
Holtzblatt, federalism is not an end in itself but rather a means to
encourage a "well-functioning democracy"5 11 and to push the political
process to a national consensuS5 12 which, while it can include
disuniformity, is driven by a national "choice, not an accident."513 This
view also does not consider some states effectively controlling other
states as a positive good. The point is not to have California's boot on
Wyoming's throat for all time, but to push the public and politicians
into engagement and compromise.514
Many of the spillovers arising from inconsistent state-by-state
regulation discussed in this Section likely fall into the quadrant of
high economic cost but low political salience, as envisioned by Gerken
507. Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal
Federalism, 113 MICH L. REV. 57, 61-62 (2014).
508. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 13, at 1359.
509. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003) ("A
basic principle of federalism is that each State may make its own reasoned judgment about what
conduct is permitted or proscribed within its borders."); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 571-73 (1996); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1989) ("The principles guiding this
assessment . . . reflect the Constitution's special concern both with the maintenance of a national
economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the
autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres." (footnotes omitted)); see also
Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality
Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1115 (2009) ("[T]he
idea that states are entitled to some autonomous sphere in which to make policy free of
interference from other sovereigns [is an 'ideological principle[]' of federalism]."); Michael S.
Greve, Choice and the Constitution 7 (Am. Enter. Inst., Federalist Outlook No. 16, 2003),
https://www.aei.org/publication/choice-and-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/53D2-PZ47]
("States must govern themselves, not one another.").
510. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 507, at 62-63.
511. Id. at 67-68.
512. Id. at 86.
513. Id. at 98.
514. Id. at 63.
[Vol. 20:1:129192
THE FINTECH FRONTIER
and Holtzblatt.5 15 After all, the specifics of how much capital money
transmitters must retain or what forms a company must file to make a
securities offering, though ultimately important to questions of access
and opportunity, are unlikely to motivate people to march in the
streets. Regulation A provides such an example, where the issue was
important to businesses seeking capital and had subsidiary effects on
workers and local economies but never prompted mass political
movements. Federalizing interventions to address those problems of
high cost and low salience are likely justified given the economic
burden that they impose compared to the minimal benefits of
maintaining inconsistency.516
Some of the issues discussed in this Article, however, may have
relatively high political salience, such as interest rate and
(potentially) virtual currency regulation (see Table 1 below). Even if
one subscribes to Gerken and Holtzblatt's view of spillovers as not
anathema per se, in most of the examples discussed here, moving to a
national consensus is appropriate.
515. Id. at 83.
516. Id. at 85 ("We think the case for regulating low-salience, economically costly
spnovers ... is easy. The democratic benefits are small, and the economic costs are high.").
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Table 1. High Economic Cost and High vs. Low Political
Salience of Fintech Issues Discussed517





High economic Regulation A




An example of this move toward a national consensus is the
regulation of the interest banks can charge. Critics often point to the
interest rate export provisions as unconstitutional51 8 "sister-state
preemption"19 that gives "Delaware or South Dakota supremacy over
[other states]."520 That criticism ignores that the extension of interest
rate export to both state-chartered and nationally chartered banks
was in furtherance of a federal policy and done under federal law. The
NBA represents a "federal law [that] completely defines what
constitutes the taking of usury by a national bank, referring to the
state law only to determine the maximum permitted rate."521
Likewise, DIDA represents a national decision to extend competitive
parity to state-chartered banks.522  Congress, a body that draws
membership from all states, provided a venue for citizens to come to a
national consensus,523 which includes some amount of intentional
disunity. To the extent that citizens change their views, they have a
517. This Table follows the pattern of the table created by Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra
note 507, at 61-62. However, given the relatively high economic costs of all the topics, it contains
only a high economic cost row.
518. Irwin v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., No. 2557, 1993 WL 837921, at *2 (Pa. Com. Pl. Dec. 9,
1993).
519. See, e.g., Yolanda D. McGill & Kathleen E. Keest, Comment on Petition for
Rule-Making to Permit Preemption of State Laws with Respect to the Interstate Activities of
State Banks (May 16, 2005), https://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/agency/
public-mcgilLtest.html [https://perma.cclRQ62-JS7D].
520. Id.
521. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 10 (2003) (quoting Evans v. Nat'l
Bank of Savannah, 251 U.S. 108, 114 (1919)).
522. See Greenwood Tr. Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 827 (1st Cir. 1992).
523. See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 507, at 108.
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mechanism to pressure their representatives in Congress to change
the law.
Contrast this with much of the state-by-state regulation
described previously.524 One state's regulations can distort the entire
national market, especially if the state is large and economically
important. For example, given New York's important position within
the financial sector, the inherent power of the NYDFS, and the broad
scope of New York's BitLicense,525 it is unclear whether Bitcoin
companies actually could avoid New York jurisdiction and remain
competitive. Even if the scope of the law is uncertain, companies will
have a strong incentive to comply to avoid being the target of the
NYDFS testing its authority. A court battle with the NYDFS over its
authority-even if successful-could bankrupt a small company. A
consumer in a state where a product would be legal, but is de facto
banned because of New York, has no recourse in Albany or with the
NYDFS. Thus, Americans everywhere may have their options
constrained by New York (or California, or Texas) because either
certain products may not be offered (if one large state prohibits them)
or state compliance costs will be passed on to customers nationwide,
requiring products that are offered to cost more.
State legislators and regulators have incentives and obligations
to create policy that they believe benefits their state without much
regard for its effect on others.526 Policies that internalize benefits and
export costs are a likely consequence.527 For example, New York's
BitLicense is designed to respond to the internal policy preferences
and political bargains that affect New York, its citizens, and its
policymakers.528 The NYDFS did not wait for other states to come to a
general agreement, nor did it adopt any of the previous paths used by
states to that point (ignoring virtual currencies, fitting them under
existing regulations, or modifying existing regulations). Of course,
New York is not unique in this respect: each state reacts in its own
way on the basis of political and policy preferences within the state.
Such reactions, however, can result in a muddle-multiple conflicting
regimes effectively regulate people without providing them with any
meaningful recourse.529  Contrast this situation with federal
524. See supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.3, III.B.2, III.C.1, and III.D.3.
525. See Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 241, at 511-12.
526. Cf. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1987) (contrasting the
cost-benefit analysis that a federal regulator, the state where an activity occurs, and a state
downstream are likely to perform in the context of regulating water pollution).
527. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 13, at 1387-88.
528. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, §§ 200.1-22 (2017); Hughes &
Middlebrook, supra note 241, at 542.
529. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 13, at 1355.
2017] 195
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
regulation, which gives far more people at least the opportunity to
participate in the decision-making, even if the ultimate outcome is not
what everyone desires.530
Thus, even in cases of high political salience, federal action to
address spillovers can be appropriate. Such action allows for
democratic input from, and accountability to, all the citizens who have
their autonomy limited by the regulation. Federal regulation is also
not per se deregulatory, because it will likely reflect a compromise
between citizens of more restrictive states and those of less restrictive
states, resulting in a rule that is too restrictive for some states and not
restrictive enough for others.531  Furthermore, although costs and
benefits may not be spread exactly evenly because state economies
differ, it will not be as simple for policymakers to export the costs of
regulations to outsiders. Better, more responsive policy will likely
result, however, because the country is not held hostage by a handful
of states that are effectively avoiding the full costs of their regulations.
Critics of laws that allow a company to export its home state's
law, such as laws governing interest rates, worry about a "race to the
bottom."5 32 That concern is also commonly cited in discussions of state
corporate chartering, with a long line of scholars worrying that states
(most notably Delaware) race to the bottom of investor protection to
attract corporations and the fees that come with them.5 3 3 Other
scholars believe that competitive federalism in corporate charters is a
race to the top, leading to more efficient corporate law. 5 34
When considering the risk of a race to the bottom, one must
remember that consumers are not powerless and can choose to avoid
bad products. Consumer choice gives companies an incentive to (1)
seek out legislation that is attractive enough to the customers and
investors they want to do business with, and (2) avoid exploiting such
legislation to disadvantage consumers. Likewise, states have an
incentive to pass laws that attract customers and to avoid passing
laws seen as undesirable. States also have an incentive to avoid laws
that are seen as so exploitive that they mobilize the public or interest
530. See supra notes 510-16 and accompanying text.
531. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 13, at 1373.
532. Lalita Clozel, State Regulators Balk at OCC Fintech Charter, AM. BANKER (Aug. 19,
2016, 5:08 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/state-regulators-balk-at-occ-fintech-
charter [https://perma.cc/SK7Z-3SVK] ("Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks David Cotney
also said a federal charter [which would grant interest rate and money transmission home-state
export] could trump state consumer protection and licensing rules, which would be 'the
beginning of a race to the bottom.").
533. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 594-95 (2003)
(describing the "race to the bottom" theory).
534. Id. at 596 (describing the "race to the top" theory).
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groups to appeal to the federal government for preemption. By
contrast, in a world where certain states de facto regulate a national
market and prevent products with certain characteristics from being
viable, consumers have their choices limited without their input or
consent.
States have strong competitive incentives to create good laws,
and they also have strong incentives to avoid creating bad laws that
prompt federal intervention. The threat of federal preemption can be
a powerful check on any potential race to the bottom. As Professor
Mark Roe points out in the context of state chartering of corporations,
corporate law is a product not only of the states but also of the federal
government.535 As Roe says, "all corporate law could be federal
law." 53 6 This means state action, especially for a dominant state like
Delaware, is done with the threat of federal intervention in mind.5 37
In the corporate context, the federal government has intervened
through direct action538 and through threat of action.539 It is not that
states cannot compete; rather, (1) the bounds placed by the federal
government, or by the areas in which it hesitates to enter, limit the
scope of competition540 and (2) that competition can end in federal
displacement of state law if things go awry.5 4 1
Concerns about a race to the bottom in fintech can be answered
in a similar way. Creating a regime akin to that found in bank
interest rate export requires a consensus at the federal level, and if
such a regime is more harmful than helpful, the federal government
can either displace the problematic state laws or remove the exporting
capability.542  States, for their part, have an incentive to avoid
becoming too aggressive for fear they will lose their ability to regulate
(and collect the attendant fees). The expansion of the CFPB into the
interest rate debate, in the context of both the CashCall case and the
Payday Rule, indicates federal policing of consumer issues is a very
535. Id. at 598.
536. Id. at 597.
537. Id. at 598, 639-40.
538. Id. at 610, 633 (discussing various direct federal interventions into corporate
governance).
539. Id. at 601-07 (discussing incidents where the threat of federal action affected
Delaware's positions). A clear example provided by Professor Roe is the debate around
Delaware's 1988 anti-corporate takeover law. Id. at 605. Roe points to comments by the head of
the Delaware State Bar Association's corporate law committee arguing for a law that was not
maximally restrictive (which would be best for incumbent corporations) because such a law
might risk federalization of the issue. Id.
540. Id. at 639.
541. Id. at 624 (discussing the preemptive effect of NSMIA).
542. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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real possibility in the long term, making the threat of federal
intervention credible.
D. Let's Not (Always) Make a Federal Case out of It
Many of the circumstances previously discussed involve
companies operating at a national level while dealing with state
regulation. The proposed changes to Rule 147 reflected the opposite
concern. Rule 147 offerings are, by their nature, intrastate,543 but the
SEC considered imposing substantive regulations on those
offerings.544  The SEC's regulatory hook was issuers' use of an
instrumentality of interstate commerce-the Internet.545 That hook is
likely sufficient under current jurisprudence,546 but the SEC
ultimately chose (wisely) not to use its authority to impose substantive
requirements, instead deferring to the states.547 Unlike the other
examples-as this Section explains-efficiency, competitive equity,
and political equity could not support federal regulation.
Intrastate offerings are inherently limited to a single state, use
of the Internet notwithstanding. Hence, conflicting state laws are
consistent with efficiency. The costs of monitoring legislative and
regulatory developments are limited because there is only one state
with jurisdiction over a particular issuer. Ironically, the injection of
substantive federal regulation would decrease efficiency by increasing
the number of applicable rule sets and the number of regulators that
need to be monitored. Also important, adding the SEC to the
regulatory mix could delay regulatory adaptation because the federal
government is likely to be less responsive to local concerns than the
states would be.54 8 Likewise, intrastate offerings do not need federal
regulation to provide competitive equity because every company
conducting a Rule 147 offering in a given state will be regulated by
that state.549
Finally, political equity would not justify federal regulation
because Rule 147 offerings are, by their terms, limited to cases where
the company is effectively linked to the state and the investors are
residents of the same state. All the parties affected by the regulation
have some amount of democratic access and means of promoting
543. See supra note 430-34 and accompanying text.
544. See supra notes 442-43 and accompanying text.
545. See supra note 435 and accompanying text.
546. See supra note 463 and accompanying text.
547. See supra notes 456-60 and accompanying text.
548. Letter from author & Staci Warden to Brent J. Fields, supra note 440, at 6.
549. See supra note 452 and accompanying text.
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accountability.55 0  Accordingly, the relevant state legislature and
regulators have a strong incentive to create properly balanced
regulations and enforcement because both the costs and the benefits
will be felt within the state.55 1
One question that Rule 147 does present concerns the resales
of securities initially offered under Rule 147 by the original purchaser
to out-of-state parties.552  Such resales reintroduce an interstate
element to the transaction. Thus, it is appropriate that federal rules
govern the resale. First, under Rule 147, the securities cannot be sold
across state lines for the first six months after the initial purchase.553
After that period, if the offering were public under the state's laws, the
securities would presumptively be eligible to use the resale exemption
found in Section 4(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.554 Private
securities resales can rely on the provisions of Rule 144.555 Although
the exemption found in Section 4(a)(1) is broad, it represents a choice
made at the federal level to exempt such offerings. If public policy
needs dictated, Congress could change the rule.
Given the above considerations, although the federal
government can impose substantive requirements on Rule 147 initial
offerings or on other intrastate transactions with similar
characteristics, it should not. The mere presence of an
instrumentality of interstate commerce does not overcome the fact
that the economic and political realities of the transactions place them
within the individual states without the "leaking"5 56 found in the other
cited markets.
V. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
As this Article demonstrates, the allocation of regulation for
certain fintech transactions is frequently harmful to efficiency,
competition, and political equity. What should be done to mitigate
these issues and create greater regulatory consistency? Change can
come from federal regulators, Congress, the states themselves, or the
courts, although these routes may vary in their effectiveness.
550. Letter from author & Staci Warden to Brent J. Fields, supra note 440, at 6.
551. Id.
552. The Author is indebted to an anonymous reviewer who raised this question.
553. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (2017).
554. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1) (2012).
555. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (allowing the public resale of restricted securities in some
cases); see also Rule 144: Selling Restricted and Control Securities, SEC (Jan. 16, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsrulel44htm.html
[https://perma.cc/95N5-PWWC].
556. Letter from author & Staci Warden to Brent J. Fields, supra note 440, at 6.
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A. Who Should Write the Rules?
Who writes the rules, and to whom the writers are answerable,
are the core questions posed by the previous examples and by many
fintech issues more broadly. Rules can come from numerous sources
and can conflict, complement one another, or exist on parallel tracks.
Among the parties that may write rules are federal regulators,
Congress, and the states themselves. All have a potential role to play
in providing more consistent and equitable regulation, though they
may not all have the same chance of success.
Federal regulators already possess considerable power to
impact fintech regulation. For example, consider a special-purpose
bank charter for fintech firms, such as the one being pursued by the
OCC.55 7 This charter, though not without controversy,55 8 could help
address the competitive disadvantage fintech faces. It is unclear,
however, whether the charter will help anyone but the largest fintech
firms that focus on affluent customers. If the OCC's charter simply
applies regulations built for universal banks to much more limited
companies, or if it otherwise imposes significant costs,5 59 it may be of
little value to new entrants that lack the resources to manage the
associated regulatory burden. Likewise, if the OCC regulates fintech
firms, which rely on speed and nimbleness to survive, in the same way
that it regulates banks, the fintech firms-especially newer, smaller
firms that are still finding their way-may not remain viable. Given
that many fintech lenders offer higher-interest products, the informal
regulatory pressure against high rates may make the charter
unworkable. Even if the charter is viable only for larger players that
serve prime customers, it would allow those firms to compete on a
more even playing field. In that case, the charter would benefit some
557. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE
INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE 2 (2016).
558. See, e.g., Letter from Sens. Sherrod Brown & Jeffrey A. Merkley, to Thomas Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller (Jan. 9, 2017),
http://brown.senate.gov/download/occ-fintech [ ttps://perma.cc/ETV2-PNBV] (expressing concern
over the special-purpose bank charter and questioning the OCC's legal authority to offer one);
Letter from John W. Ryan to Thomas Curry, supra note 502 (opposing the special-purpose bank
charter and raising questions as to whether the OCC has the necessary statutory authority to
issue a "fintech" charter).
559. For example, the OCC is considering imposing enhanced capital requirements and
CRA-like obligations, and potentially requiring more onerous small-business borrower
"protections" as a condition of granting a fintech charter. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH




consumers, but it nevertheless would miss an opportunity to serve a
broader population.
The bank regulators could also seek to address the harm and
uncertainty done by the Madden decision to marketplace lending5 6 0
via regulation.561 Promulgating a rule holding that under federal law
a valid loan made by a bank does not become invalid once sold to a
nonbank would preempt state laws to the contrary562 and be
consistent with the OCC's previously stated position on the power of
banks.563 Such a rule could also potentially address the "true lender"
question564 if it holds that a bank is not required to retain a
"predominant economic interest" in a loan in order to exercise its
power to lend. Such a rule would no doubt be controversial, and it
would only treat a symptom caused by the unfair and inefficient
regulatory system currently facing fintech firms-rather than the
underlying cause-but it would help address at least some of the
practical harms to credit access caused by inapt state regulation.
Congress has even more flexibility. Congress could create a
regime that provides consistency, avoids unnecessary duplication, and
is accessible to new firms that may not be large enough to benefit from
a bank charter. Hughes and Middlebrook advocate a bifurcation of
responsibility between the states and federal government.565 This
division would be based on which level of government has the most
experience regulating the different aspects of a cryptocurrency
transaction (for example, anti-money-laundering issues would be left
to the federal government and payment execution regulation to the
states).566  Similarly, Congress could federalize certain aspects of
regulation in which state-by-state differences are most harmful, while
leaving other aspects to the states, such as allowing a state lending or
money transmission license to serve as a passport between states.
That approach would be similar to the regulation of state banks, for
which federal action permits interest rate export, but much of the rest
560. See supra notes 100-22 and accompanying text.
561. BRIAN KNIGHT, MERCATUS ON POLIcY: RISKS TO INNOVATIVE CREDIT POSED BY
EMERGIN REGULATORY AND LITIGATION TRENDS 4 (2017) https://www.mercatus.org/
system/files/knight-risks-innovative-credit-mop-v1 .pdf [https://perma.cc/GV45-2SBV]; Brian
Knight, Comment Letter on Examination Guidance for Third-Party Lending 2 (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-fdic-guidance-third-party-lending.pdf
[https://perma.cclMX2Y-9BLU]; see also Alan S. Kaplinsky, OCC Must Stand up for Preemption,
AM. BANKER (Mar. 20, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/occ-must-
stand-up-for-preemption [https://perma.cc/MXR9-4S37].
562. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996).
563. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
564. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
565. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 241, at 549.
566. Id.
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of the regulation remains at the state level.5 6 7 The challenge is
determining which functions or criteria should be federalized and
which should remain under state control.
The states themselves can also harmonize their requirements,
as they have done with Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which governs the transfer of funds.568 It is unclear whether any of
the fintech-related model laws discussed here will ultimately matter,
however. Those laws not only need to gain sufficient traction to be
widely adopted, but they must remain sufficiently consistent over
time. Only then can fintech firms have confidence in their regulatory
environment and avoid expensive monitoring costs. Experience to
date suggests that success is unlikely. The states have not
harmonized their lending and money transmission laws, even ignoring
Congress's call to harmonize such laws.569 Future harmonization is
unlikely without federal government action.
Another option, advocated by Professor J.W. Verret, would be
to allow for home-state charter recognition akin to how states respect
the corporate law of other states.570 There is a long history of state
corporate charter recognition,571 but the same tradition of political
comity does not exist for financial firm charters.57 2 States are unable
to compete with one another to offer the best legal regime because
firms need to comply with every state's law. As Verret acknowledges,
somewhat akin to state banks, it is likely the federal government will
need to compel that recognition if it is to occur at all.5 7 3
It may make sense to allow companies to opt into federal
fintech regulation that overlaps with state law. Companies that
operate in only a single state or a few states may be able to comply
with those state laws more efficiently than with an overarching
federal regime, and providing opt-in will allow companies to avoid
regulatory regimes that are inefficient or that put them at a
competitive disadvantage. That approach would ensure regulatory
567. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
568. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 241, at 519; see also Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra
note 507, at 94 (citing the UCC as an example of an effective solution to inconsistent laws among
states).
569. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
570. Verret, supra note 11, at 35-36.
571. Id. at 13-14.
572. Id. at 36.
573. Id. at 36-37. The current dual banking system is considered by some to encourage
this sort of salutary regulatory competition. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking
System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32 (1977). But see Henry N.
Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 677, 683-93 (1988) (arguing that the dual banking system does not encourage
competition so much as rent splitting between federal and state governments).
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coverage, but it would allow companies that operate only in a single
state or a few states to avoid a federal regime that may not be
appropriate for them. The opt-in method might encourage competition
between the states and federal government. However, it is possible an
opt-in regime could negate the benefits of a federal system if state
regulation created sufficiently costly spillovers for which the
companies did not pay, giving companies insufficient incentive to
move to the federal system.57 4
Policymakers may also consider whether hybrid regulation, in
which the states' and federal government's regulatory regimes overlap
or coexist, is appropriate. Even in areas of significant federal
preemption, states are able to enforce laws that are not explicitly
preempted.5 75 It may make sense to explicitly federalize only those
elements of regulation where the state-by-state model impinges on
efficiency, competitive equity, and political equity, while leaving other
issues to the states. Determining which is which, however, would be
the challenge.
Hybrid regulation can also include coextensive regulation,
which may be more problematic. For example, Section 1041 of
Dodd-Frank precludes preemption of state laws that offer "greater"
consumer protection.5 76 As a result, states that embrace "greater"
consumer protection are able to set policy for themselves and
potentially for other states. Other states that favor less "protective"
rules (as defined by the CFPB) are precluded from exercising
sovereignty.5 7 7  This arrangement denies certain states political
equality without providing offsetting efficiency benefits. As Professor
Michael Greve points out, hybrid regulation, in which the federal
government sets a floor but not a ceiling, does not create consistency,
but rather can serve as a jumping-off point for further idiosyncratic
state regulation.57 8 Although commentators have raised concerns that
preempting state law will weaken consumer protections,5 79 the better
574. The Author is grateful to one of the anonymous peer-reviewers for raising this
concern.
575. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2012) (narrowing the scope of federal preemption of state
consumer financial aws).
576. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1041(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2011-12 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5551(a)(2)
(2012)).
577. Id. (deeming that Dodd-Frank only preempts state law to the degree it is
inconsistent, but that state "statutes, regulations, orders, or interpretations" that provide
consumers with "greater" protection, as determined by the Bureau, is not inconsistent).
578. Michael S. Greve, Business, the States, and Federalism's Political Economy, 25
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 895, 903 (2005).
579. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 32, at 81-82.
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answer may be to create uniform rules adequate to provide
appropriate protection to govern the national market.5 80
B. Who Should Enforce the Rules?
The previous Section focused on the rules to which market
actors are subject. However, the question of who enforces those
rules-or threatens to enforce them-is also important. The question
can arise in cases where state laws or rules are so broad that they may
allow a regulator to bring enforcement actions against companies that
have weak or tangential ties, and in cases where there is a common
rule but multiple regulators share jurisdiction-situations that can
lead to a consistent rule in theory becoming an inconsistent rule in
practice.
The enforcers of regulations, such as the states' attorneys
general and banking commissioners, are not immune to the
temptation to capture benefits while exporting costs.58 1 Although
attorneys general and commissioners may be sensitive to the political
preferences of their state, they are less concerned with the perception
of out-of-state residents, who lack a direct means of applying political
pressure to check the enforcers' actions.582  That situation might
encourage regulators to stretch their authority over companies
without political means of redress.
For example, given the scope of the BitLicense,583 the NYDFS
could use its virtual currency regulations to bring an enforcement
action against a company that may have only tangential or incidental
ties to New York (if any at all). The NYDFS may wish to bring an
action because it feels it is justified on the basis of a company's
conduct, but it may also be motivated by political factors such as
wishing to appear tough or making an example of a foreign firm to
change licensed firms' behavior. The NYDFS may also be motivated
to pursue foreign firms because those firms lack the means of political
response that domestic firms possess. The threat of litigation could
chill activity outside New York for fear of an enforcement action that
could bankrupt a company even if that company successfully
resisted.584
580. See supra note 464 and accompanying text.
581. PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL 210-11 (2015) (looking at the impact of state
attorneys general and their litigation on national markets).
582. Id. at 211.
583. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
584. A related example, albeit one with limited chance of bankruptcy, is the New York
Attorney General's use of New York's Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352-353 (McKinney
2017), a law that empowers the New York Attorney General to launch sweeping investigations
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Even in areas with robust federalization, such as bank
regulation, the states are not completely excluded.585  In fact,
Dodd-Frank goes even further in Section 1042,586 which empowers
state attorneys general and regulators to bring civil suits to enforce
Dodd-Frank's consumer protection provisions (though they are limited
to enforcing CFPB regulations against banks).5 87  That provision
places state regulators in a position to enforce not only their states'
non-preempted laws, but also federal law. Arguably, this nonexclusive
approach to enforcement invites disparate treatment, depending on
how the various attorneys general interpret the law. The approach
risks creating fifty or more different interpretations of the same law.
It could, in turn, lead to inefficient inconsistency, usurpation of
authority by states with aggressive attorneys general, and the
imposition of externalities on other states without democratic
redress.18
Considering the unpredictability of state-by-state regulations
for particularly sensitive transactional elements, federal enforcement
should provide more consistency and allow
real-albeit imperfect-redress to those affected. This is not to say
that federal enforcement is guaranteed to be good enforcement.589
However, federal enforcement may be able to provide consistent
application of the rules nationwide, as well as among competitors, and
may be subject to broad political accountability. These attributes
recommend it for cases where the true nature of a transaction is
interstate.
into possible financial fraud, to investigate ExxonMobil for failing to write down the value of its
oil reserves as a means to facilitate an investigation driven by concerns about climate change,
rather than securities fraud. See, e.g., Christopher M. Matthews, New York AG Employs
Powerful Law in Exxon Probe, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2016, 5:38 PM),
https://www.wsj.comlarticles/new-york-ag-employs-powerful-law-in-exxon-probe- 1474061881
[https://perma.cc/5JXS-C72G].
585. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, LLC, 557 U.S. 519, 536 (2009) (holding
that federal banking regulations did not preempt a state's ability to enforce state lending law).
586. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1042(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2012 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1) (2012)).
587. Id. § 5552(a)(2).
588. NOLETI'E, supra note 581, at 211.
589. Examples of flawed enforcement abound. For those on the right, Operation Choke
Point and the FDIC's treatments of financial institutions that offered refund-anticipation loans
are examples of federal regulatory abuse. See supra notes 70, 224-27 and accompanying text. For
those on the left, the perceived capture of financial regulators in the run-up to the 2007-2009
financial crisis shows how federal regulators can fall down on the job. Adam J. Levitin, The
Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2049 (2014) ("While the financial regulatory system [pre-2008 crisis] was
undoubtedly outdated in many ways, it is hard to deny that capture [of financial regulators by
regulated entities] played some role, if not the leading role, in the crisis").
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Determining who should enforce is difficult given the variables
and trade-offs that encumber every example. In many of the areas
previously discussed, the interests of efficiency, competitive equity,
and political equity argue for more federalization of enforcement,
though the states are likely in the best position in cases of intrastate
transactions.
C. What About the Courts?
Finally, the courts have a role to play. As the jumble that is
"true lender" law demonstrates, uncertainty imposed by litigation can
harm efficiency and competition, and it can privilege some citizens
over others. Providing clarity on who has the right to write the
rules-and consistency on questions such as whether a lending
contract applies-will help both market participants and citizens,
who, to the extent that they are displeased with the courts' consensus,
can lobby Congress to make a change.
VI. CONCLUSION
Financial technology is changing how people access financial
services and who provides those services. The dramatic and rapid
changes are placing significant stress on the regulatory and legal
framework for financial services, including the balance of authority
between the federal government and the states. Often, the current
allocation leads to harmful inefficiency and a lack of competitive and
political parity. In those cases, federal policymakers should consider
federalizing fintech regulation and displacing state-by-state rules to
an appropriate degree. However, in cases where the transaction is
truly intrastate, the federal government should defer to the states,
even if the Constitution would allow federalization. Harmonizing the
level at which the markets are regulated with their economic,
competitive, and political reality will lead to a more competitive,
efficient, and just result. Such harmonization will help consumers,
market participants, and the country as a whole flourish.
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